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I. Introduction
The terrorist enemy that threatens civilization today is unlike any we have
ever known .... [Terrorists] enjoy the benefits of our free society even as
they commit themselves to our destruction. They exploit our openness -
not randomly or haphazardly - but by deliberate, premeditated design....
[W]e are at war with an enemy who abuses individual rights as it abuses jet
airliners: as weapons with which to kill Americans.I
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
2
At 8:45 in the morning on September 11,2001 (9-11), American Airlines
Flight 11 slammed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center in New
York City.' Twenty minutes later, as live television cameras rolled and
stunned New Yorkers gazed up in disbelief, a second plane, United Airlines
Flight 175, banked left and ripped through the World Trade Center's North
Tower.4 Barely forty minutes after these devastating explosions that ultimately
would topple the preeminent icon of America's economic dominance, a third
1. Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing on DOJ
Oversight Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Hearing
on DOJ Oversight] (statement of John Ashcroft, Attorney General available at 2001 WL
1558164 (F.D.C.H.).
2. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
3. America Attacked Tuesday September 11, 2001: Another Day of Infamy, at httpJ/
usgovinfo.about.com/libmry/blattack09l1 l.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2002) [hereinafter America
Attacked].
4. Id.
THE FOURTH AMENIDMENT AND THE WAR ON TERROR 923
civilian jetliner, American Airlines Flight 77, barreled into the United States'
military headquarters at the Pentagon.5
In just over an hour, terrorists crippled two of the most important symbols
of American society and took the lives of nearly 3,000 people;6 on 9-11 the
horrible reality of modem terrorism found a global television audience. With
nothing more imposing than box cutters,7 nineteen single-minded zealots
realized what now seem disturbingly prophetic words: "[Tihe technology of
transportation about the planet has advanced to a point where it has become
increasingly easy to plan and implement highly destructive terrorist actions in
the territory of another state." Now, the dust and smoke that lingered for so
long over lower Manhattan has cleared and workers have mended the gaping
wound in the Pentagon, yet the true breadth of the attacks' impact on the
United States is only just coming to light. For more than two centuries, the
United States has stood as a nation of carefully counterbalanced laws and
freedoms. However, the tragic events of 9-11 have threatened the very nature
of American society and forced our nation to reset the scales and to reevaluate
just how free we can afford to be.
The United States government responded quickly to 9-11, both at home
and abroad. Within hours, federal buildings in Washington, D.C. closed their
doors and the Federal Aviation Administration shut down U.S. airports,
diverting all in-flight craft to airports in Canada.9 Within days, President Bush
issued an Executive Order calling the ready reserves of the armed forces to
active duty1° and the Departnent of Justice (DOJ) initiated what Attorney
5. Id.
6. See Latest Additions to Victims List, AP ONIINE, Feb. 5, 2002 (noting 2,759 con-
firmed deaths in 9-11 terrorist attacks), available at 2002 WL 11688056.
7. See, e.g., County Responds 4fter Terrorist Attack, WASI POST, Sept. 13, 2001, at
C14 ("[The highjackers] were armed with ... boxcutters - very sharp razors used to cut
cardboard."); Doug Hanchett & Jessica Heslam,Attack on America, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 13,
2001, at 012 ("Authorities believe Arab terrorists, possibly linked to Osama bin Laden, boarded
the planes at Logan armed with either knives or boxcutters." , Niles Lathem, Anatomy of an
Atrocity, N.Y. POST, Sept. 16, 2001, at 10 (noting that hijackers aboard American Airlines
Flight 77 carried knives and boxcutters); Stephen Power & Andy Pasztor, Aftermath of Terror:
FAA Issues 3 Pages of New Requirements, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2001, at A22 (noting that
FAA "banned knives 'of any length or description' from being carried on board, after reports
the hijackers carried boxcutters").
8. W. Michael Reisman, InternationalLegalResponses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J. INT'L
L. 3,4 (1999).
9. America Attacked, supra note 3.
10. Exec. Order No. 13,223, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,201 (Sept. 14, 2001), available at httpJ/
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914-5.html. In the months following 9-11,
it came to light that the executive branch also activated a cold war contingency plan that moved
59 WASH. &LEE L. REV 921 (2002)
General John Ashcroft would later claim to be the largest investigation ever
undertaken." In less than a month, the intensive cross-agency investigation
into the 9-11 attacks yielded the arrest or detention of at least 614 individuals
considered either suspects or material witnesses.12
With the nation gripped in fear, President Bush created an entirely new
executive agency, the Office of Homeland Defense, and charged it with
"develop[ing] and coordinat[ing] the implementation of a comprehensive
national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks."' 3
Then, as the reaction at home started to take shape, President Bush initiated
diplomatic operations overseas to secure the arrest of the man suspected of
masterminding the 9-11 attacks - Osama bin Laden.' 4 When diplomacy failed
to bring them to justice, the President took justice to the terrorists, and on
October 7, 2001 American warplanes loosed their first satellite-guided muni-
tions over targets in Afghanistan. 1
The unilateral actions taken by the executive branch in the weeks and
months following 9-11 were undeniably momentous and arguably unprece-
dented. However, it is the law of the United States that must provide the chief
component of any effective program "to identify, convict, and ultimately
deter, those who intend to commit violence against our people and our institu-
some 100 key executive officials to secret fortified locations on the cast coast. See Amy Gold-
stein & Juliet Eilperin, Congress Not Advised of Shadow Government, WASH. POST, Mar. 2,
2002, at A01 (discussing revelation of cold war contingency plan intended to ensure functioning
government if Washington attacked).
11. See Hearing on DOJ Oversight, supra note 1 (statement of John Ashcroft, Attorney
General) ("We have launched the largest, most comprehensive criminal investigation in world
history to identify the killers of September 11 and to prevent further terrorist attacks."). As part
of this investigation, Ashcroft implemented emergency law enforcement measures allowing
extended detention of immigration law violators, and ordered every United States Attorney's
office to establish an Anti-Terrorism Task Force. Attorney General John Ashcroft, News
Briefing at Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters (Sept. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/agcrisisremarks9_I 8.htm (last visited Dec. 2,2001).
12. See Attorney General Ashcroft, News Briefing (Oct. 8,2001) ("And since September
11, we have arrested or detained 614 persons."), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/agcrisis
remarksl 0_08.htm (last visited Nov. 9,2002).
13. Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 8, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nws/releases/2001/10/20011008-2.html.
14. See Jesse Pesta, Afghans May Ask Suspect in Terror Attacks to Leave; Clash of
Koran, Culture, WAL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2001, at A16 (noting that President Bush demanded that
Taliban turn over terrorists and close training camps).
15. See Dave Moniz & Andrea Stone, High-Tech Attacks "Baby Step One" of Campaign;
First Phase Aims to Disrupt Taliban, Clear Way for Aid, USA TODAY, Oct. 8, 2001, at 3A
(noting that on October 7, 2001 American bombers dropped satellite-guided bombs on targets
in Afghanistan).
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tions. ' 16 Thus, the administration's most important reaction to 9-11 came in
the form of appeals for legislative action." Congress quickly heeded the
executive's requests, and on October 25 the Senate passed the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (PATRIOT)."' The next day, President
George W. Bush signed PATRIOT into law, promising that the new legisla-
tion would fight terrorism without sacrificing constitonal ideals. 9
PATRIOT moved through Congress with near record speed, outpacing
the congressional reaction to the Oklahoma City bombing by several months.2"
The expediency with which the counter-terrorism legislation moved through
the House and Senate was largely the product of executive prodding.2 The
16. Ronald J. Sievert Meeting the Twenty-First Century Terrorist Threat Within the
Scope of Twentieth Century Constitutional Law, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1421, 1428 (2000).
17. See HearingonAnti-Terrorism Legislation Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Hearing on Anti-Terrorism Legislation] (statement of John
Ashcroft, Attorney General) ("Today [the DOJi seek[s] to enlist [Congress's] assistance, for we
seek new laws against America's enemies, foreign and domestic."), available at
httpiwww.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/2001/agcrisisremarks9_24.htm (last visited Sept. 30,2002).
18. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001) [hereinafter PATRIOT].
19. See Ann McFeatters, Bush Signs Anti-Terror Bill; Says Tough Law Will Preserve
Constitutional Rights, Prrr. POST-GAZETrE, Oct. 27, 2001, at A6 (noting that Bush "insisted
the law will preserve constitutional rights, although many critics have worried that it signals too
much change and an erosion of civil liberties").
20. See 147 CoNG. REc. S10,990 (2001) (statementofSen. Leahy) (noting that PATRIOT
passed much more quickly than legislation in response to Oklahoma City bombing). Despite
"ft]he bipartisan call for a quick and forceful legislative response," Congress showed consider-
able restraint in drafting legislation after the Oklahoma City bombing. Note, Blown Away? The
Bill of Rights after Oklahoma City, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2074, 2074-75 (1996) [hereinafter
Blown Away]. This Harvard Law Review note has argued that the legislation passed after
Oklahoma City was too cautious and that the restraint resulted in a law that was ineffective for
combating terrorism. Id. "Many of the legislative responses proposed in the wake of the
Oklahoma City bombing would have granted expanded investigatory powers to law enforce-
ment." Id. at 2077.
21. See Hearing on Anti-Terrorism Legislation, supra note 17 (statement of John
Ashcroft, Attorney General) (discussing need for speedy response). Attorney General Ashcroft
stated:
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the American people do not have the
luxury of unlimited time in erecting the necessary defenses to future terrorist acts.
The danger that darkened the United States of America and the civilized world on
September 11 th did not pass with the atrocities committed that day. They require
that we provide law enforcement with the tools necessary to identify, dismantle,
disrupt and punish terrorist organizations before they strike again.
Id.; see also 147 CONG. REC. SI 1,020 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (noting that shortly
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Bush administration, through Attorney General Ashcroft, repeatedly stressed
that the challenges of modem terrorism required the rapid development of an
entirely new paradigm for national security efforts. 22 Ashcroft claimed that
any delay in legislative action would only extend America's vulnerability.2
Congress rewarded Ashcroft's persistence with something that prior adminis-
trations long had sought: wide latitude in the use of electronic surveillance
for national security investigations. 24 It appears that the tragic reality of 9-11
has bolstered the longstanding argument in favor of increasing national
security, even if such action risks diluting the freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution.2
after 9-11, Ashcroft introduced bill and "urged Congress to enact it by the end of the week.
That was plainly impossible, but the pressure to move on [PATRIOT] quickly, without delibera-
tion and debate, has been relentless ever since."); 147 CONG. REC. S10,991 (2001) (statement
of Sen. Leahy) (noting "administration's request for prompt consideration").
22. See Hearing on Anti-Terrorism Legislation, supra note 17, (statement of John
Ashcroft, Attorney General) (discussing approach to modem terrorism). Attorney General
Ashcroft noted:
Our fight against terrorism is not merely or primarily a criminal justice endeavor.
It is defense of our nation and its citizens. We cannot wait for terrorists to strike
to begin investigations and to take action. The death tolls are too high, the conse-
quences too great. We must prevent first - we must prosecute second.
Id.
23. See Expanding Terrorism Investigation Prosecution: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, Attorney General)
("Until Congress [passes] these changes, we are fighting an unnecessarily uphill battle. [W]e
are today sending our troops into the modem field of battle with antique weapons. It is not a
prescription for victory."), available at httpJ/www.usdoj.gov/agftestimony/2001/agerisisremar
ks9_24.htn (last visited Oct. 25, 2002).
24. See United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 324 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (noting "campaign of the police and intelligence agencies to obtain exemptions
from the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment"); Blown Away, supra note 20, at 2079
(noting that original Oklahoma City bills sought to expand electronic surveillance authority to
terrorism-related offenses).
25. See Lt. Gerald F. Reimers, IL Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 4 J. NAT'L SEC.
L. 55, 75 (2000) (discussing balance between security and freedom). Lt. Reimers noted:
The consideration [of] the relationship between the federal government's need to
accumulate information concerning activities within the United States of foreign
powers and the people's right of privacy as embodied in statute and the Fourth
Amendment, represents, in effect, part of the federal judiciary's attempt to strike a
proper balance between these two compelling, albeit not easily reconciled, interests.
Id. (quoting William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physical Searches for
Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Executive Order 12,333 and the Fourth Amendment, 35 CATH.
U. L. REv. 97, 104-05 (1985)); see also Seivert, supra note 16, at 1423 (noting tension "be-
tween the demand for security and demands for protection of individual rights," and that it falls
to law enforcement and courts to "make real and practical decisions" to balance the competing
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PATRIOT brings dramatic changes to the United States' legal landscape
that belie the rapidity of the Act's creation and seriously threaten to erode
citizens' civil liberties. Although provisions in PATRIOT alter the federal
government's posture on a myriad of important issues from immigration to
money laundering,26 the most problematic alterations from a constitutional
standpoint are those affecting national security surveillance and the sharing of
information between executive agencies. First, PATRIOT loosens the already
lax standards for obtaining and implementing judicially.authorized national
security surveillanceP and increases the technology available to government
agents implementing such investigations.2" Furthermore, PATRIOT permits
the broad dissemination of information obtained in national security investiga-
tions among various government agencies.29 Taken as a whole, PATRIOT
provides more than just the tools necessary to fight terrorism; it provides the
key components to a twenty-first century Orwellian nightmare.
30
interests); Mark 0. Young, What Big Eyes and Ears You Havel: A New Regime for Covert
Governmental Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1018 (2001) ("In the wake of the
tragedy of September 11, the attitude towards the propriety of widespread surveillance seems
to have markedly changed.").
26. PATRIOT, supra note 18, §§ 411-20, 115 Stat at 356-63 (Enhanced Immigration
Provisions); id. §§ 311-30, 115 Stat. at 298-320 (International Counter Money Laundering and
Related Measures).
27. See id. § 218, 115 Stat. at 291 (amending Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) to permit warrant when foreign intelligence is "a significant purpose" as opposed to "the
purpose" of investigation); see also infra notes 171-82 and accompanying text (discussing
relaxed standard of probable cause and judicial review under FISA).
28. See PATRIOT, supra note 18, §§ 206-07, 115 Stat. at 282-83 (allowing roving FISA
wiretaps); id.§§ 214,216, 115 Stat. at 286-90 (allowing FISA pen register and "trap and trace"
orders).
29. See id. § 203, 115 Stat. at 278-81 (authorizing sharing of information among law
enforcement and intelligence agencies of federal government).
30. Although an allusion to 1984's Big Brother may seem a bit of a stretch, the actions
of DOJ in recent months, such as the decision to begin monitoring attorney-client conversations
and religious and political groups, suggest the allusion may not be that far off the mark- See
inffra note 32 (discussing latest executive policy changes). Furthermore, the Bush administra-
tion, through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, has begun funding
a program called Total Information Awareness that bears disturbing similarities to Orwell's
fiction. See Nicholas Kulish & Ann Davis, White House Defends Information-Awareness Plan,
WAIL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2002, at A4 (discussing response of Bush administration to critics of
proposed program); Jonathan Turley, Government Creating Database to Track Citizens: Where
is the Outcry Against this Massive Surveillance System, CRAR. OBSERVER, Nov. 21, 2002, at
17A (discussing program and noting that "it now appears that Orwell is busy at work in the
darkest recesses of the Bush administration and its new Information Awareness Office"). "As
envisioned, the system which remains several years from implementation, would sift through
large quantities of data... to try to identify potential terrorist activity." Kulish & Davis, supra.
Allegedly the world's largest computer database, the system could have "the ability to track
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At the time of this writing, PATRIOT is barely four months old, and yet
the Bush administration is seeking still greater legislative fiatel and is taking
further unilateral actions that undoubtedly will trouble many civil libertari-
ans.32 The Bush adcmstrton's efforts to Combat terrorism vividly illustrate
"the Executive's proclivity for occupying the power vacuums that result from
the ponderous nature of the legislative and judicial processes."3 3 Although the
every credit card purchase, travel reservation, medical treatment and common transaction by
every citizen in the United States." Turley, supra. Some critics of the program have already
suggested that Total Information Awareness could easily see use in areas beyond terrorism and,
for instance, "might rapidly evolve into a tool to fight drug trafficking." Kulish & Davis, supra.
This is a proposition the reader should keep in mind when considering Part IV.B.I of this Note.
Several provisions in PATRIOT not discussed in this Note also dramatically augment the
governmental surveillance of United States citizens. For instance, the Act expands the classifi-
cation of domestic terrorism to an extent that could saddle a large number of domestic political
groups with the damning designation of terrorist organization. See PATRIOT, supra note 18,
§ 802, 115 Stat. at 376 (revising definition of domestic terrorism); JOHN W. WHITEHEAD &
STEVENH. ADEN, FOR=mNW"ENDURiNG FREEDOM" FOR "HoMEAND SEcurrny": A CONST-
TurIONALANALYSIS OFTHEUSAPATRIOTACTAND THEJml DEPARTMENT'sANH-TRROR-
IsM INrATIvEs 13 (2002) (Rutherford Institute White Paper) ("Conceivably, these extensions
of the definition of 'terrorist' could bring within their sweep diverse domestic political groups
which have been accused of acts of intimidation or property damage such as Act Up, PETA,
Operation Rescue, and the Vieques demonstrators." (citation omitted)), available at
http://www.rutherford.org/documents/pdf/trianalysisof usa-pat-act.pdf (last visited
July 28, 2002). In considering the significance of this expansion, we must remember that
"[d]efimitions of terrorism are particularly outcome sensitive precisely because they tend
to delimit the range oflawful responses to them." Reisman, supra note 8, at 9.
31. See Clyde Haberman,A Nation Challenged-An Overview: Nov 30, 2001, Expanded
Spy Powers, Post-Taliban Bickering, An Anthrax Clue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2001, at BI
(discussing administration's attempts to augment surveillance authority); Jim McGee, Bush
Team Seeks Broader Surveillance Powers: Congress Asked to Remove Legal Restrictions on
CIA, FBI Ability to Intercept Suspects' Communications, WASH. POST, Dec. 2,2001, at A25
(same).
32. For instance, the administration invoked a policy change that gives federal agents
authority to eavesdrop on certain conversations between suspected terrorists and their attorneys.
See George Lardner, Jr., ABA UrgesAshcrofl to Kill Order, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2002, at Al 0
(noting that on October 31, 2001, Ashcroft issued order permitting government to "listen in on
talks between lawyers and clients"). President Bush signed a Military Order allowing the trial
of foreign terrorist suspects before military tribunals instead of referring such cases to federal
courts. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001), available
at httpJ/www.whitehouse.gov/newa/releases/2001/1 1/20011113-27.html. In perhaps the most
troubling response, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has begun rethinking surveillance
guidelines - enacted in response to the Hoover era - largely disallowing the investigation of
religious and political groups. Ashcrofl Seeking to Free FB.L to Spy on Groups, N.Y. TIMES
ONuNE, Dec. 1,2001, available at http://tiger.berkeley.edu/sohrab/politics/fbispying.html (last
visited July 27, 2002).
33. Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and
First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 793,
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administration is almost certainly taking these steps in good faith and with the
best of intentions, "[e]xperience should teach us to be most on our guard to
protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent." '34
Congress has grown increasingly wary of executive efforts to combat
terrorism and has held hearings to consider whether the Bush administration's
response to the terrorist threat is in accordance with the ideals of our free
democratic society. 5 This Note argues that Congress's apprehension is well
advised but perhaps belated; PATRIOT may already have gone too far. While
Congress considered PATRIOT, there was testimony that the enhanced surveil-
lance authority granted under the statute, coupled with the disintegration of the
wall that traditionally has separated intelligence services from law enforcement
communities, presents a credible threat to the protections guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment.' This Note addresses certain provisions within PA-
TRIOT affecting surveillance law and the sharing of information between the
law enforcement and intelligence communities and seeks to ascertain the
validity of these constitutional concerns.
This Note contends that PATRIOT provides the executive branch with
tremendous flexibility over the implementation of electronic surveillance for
national security purposes, and that this leeway could result in a circumvention
of the Fourth Amendment in a wide range of criminal prosecutions. 7 This
795 (1989).
34. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
35. See Preserving Freedoms While Fighting Terrorism: Hearing Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Preserving Freedoms] (statement of Sen.
Patrick Leahy) (noting oversight committee's duty to examine actions by executive and that
"[a]s with several of the unilateral steps announced by the administration over the last month,
a question that puzzles many about the order on military tribunals is this: What does it really
gain us in the fight against terrorism?"), available at 2001 WL 1563893 (F.D.C.H.); John
Lancaster, Hearings Reflect Some Unease with Ashcrofl's Legal Approach, WASiL POST, Dec.
2, 2001, at A25 (discussing congressional concern over Bush administration's efforts to fight
terrorism).
36. See Protecting Constitutional Freedoms in the Face of Terrorism: Hearing Before
the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights, 107th Cong.
(2001) [hereinafter Protecting ConstitutionalFreedoms] (statement of Jerry Berman, Executive
Director, Center for Democracy & Technology) ("PATRIOT Act tear[s] down the 'wall'
between the government's authority to conduct counter-intelligence surveillance against foreign
powers and terrorist groups, and its authority to conduct criminal investigations on Ameri-
cans."), available at http:/fjudiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/tclO0301scbenian.htm (last visited Oct.
25,2002).
37. Although not specifically addressed herein, the consequences of this end-around could
be particularly perilous in national security domestic surveillance in which Fourth Amendment
principles in the context of the First Amendment right of free speech are likely implicated. See
United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313-14 (1972) (discussing First and
Fourth Amendment values). The Court noted:
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Note further suggests that the new paradigm urged by the executive and
codified in PATRIOT is incongruous with the principles underlying the Su-
preme Court's decisions regarding national security surveillance and discards
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act's (FISA) 5 carefully crafted constitu-
tional balance.39 Ultimately, this Note asserts that PATRIOT could result in
constitutional sacrifices that contravene our democratic principles and under-
mine the foundation of our free society, granting the twisted terrorist minds
behind 9-11 an utterly undeserved measure of victory.'
This Note consists of three primary parts. Part H considers Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence regarding electronic surveillance, focusing in
particular on those cases leading to the surveillance procedures codified in
FISA.4 In so doing, Part II illuminates the principles that have guided federal
courts in evaluating surveillance procedures and considers the circumstances
under which the courts have allowed and disallowed intrusions upon personal
autonomy and privacy. Part II also considers the judiciary's deference to
executive policy in the realm of national security and the role this approach
will play as PATRIOT faces inevitable challenges in the courts.42
National security cases, moreover, often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth
Amendment values not present in cases of "ordinary" crime... Fourth Amendment
protections become the more necessary when the targets of official surveillance may
be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger to political
dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as
the power to protect "domestic security."
Id.
38. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-62 (2001).
39. See Reimers, supra note 25, at 70 (noting that FISA "check[s]" executive branch and
that "[w]hat before was all but exclusive executive branch turf was divided in all three and
thereby 'balanced'").
40. See Sievert, supra note 16, at 1423 ("Some terrorists hope to provoke a response that
undermines our Constitutional system of government. So U.S. leaders must find the appropriate
balance by adopting counterterrorism policies which are effective but also respect the demo-
cratic traditions which are the bedrock of America's strength." (quoting NAT'L COMM'N ON
TERRORISM, COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREATOF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, H.R. Doc.
No. 106-250, at 6 (2000))); see also W rEHAD & ADEN, supra note 30, at I ("We will not
allow this enemy to win the war by changing our way of life or restricting our freedoms." (citing
President Bush's Remarks, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at A2)), available at
http://www.rutherford.org/document/pdfYtrianalysisof usapat act.pdf (last visited Oct. 2 1,
2002).
41. Several commentators have taken a more in-depth look at the constitutional ramifica-
tions of government sponsored surveillance. For an excellent overview of government surveil-
lance technologies and practices and the constitutional ramifications thereof, see Young, supra
note 25.
42. See 147 CoNG. REc. SI0,990 (2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("[S]ome of the
provisions contained both in this bill and the original USA Act will face difficult tests in the
930
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Part I considers the structure and history of FISA before the enactment
of PATRIOT and the constitutional challenges to that structure. Part M also
addresses the development of the historic "wall" separating the law enforce-
ment community from intelligence agencies. This discussion considers first
how the wall dividing these two entities came about, and second, how the
policy became incorporated in the original structure of FISA. Finally, Part III
explores and introduces factors that have blurred the line between law enforce-
ment and intelligence operations and have led to the erosion of the wall in
recent years.
Part IV examines several key provisions within PATRIOT against the
backdrop ofthe discussions set forth in Parts II and III. First, Part IV explores
PATRIOT's new surveillance measures and the modifications it brings to
existing surveillance law, particularly to FISA. Second, Part IV considers the
statutory grant of authority to share information among executive agencies and
the likely implications of this new policy with respect to evidence obtained
through FISA surveillance. Part IV also addresses the possible implementation
of PATRIOT outside the realm of terrorism. Finally, Part IV argues that
PATRIOT is far more sweeping than the administration would have us
believe43 and will affect criminal investigations entirely unrelated to
terrorism. 4 This Note chiefly contends that the changes to FISA remove the
Act from the constitutional strictures established by the federal judiciary, and
that this removal - coupled with increased dissemination of information among
agencies and limited executive accountability - presents a specific, realistic
threat to American civil liberties.
This discussion, particularly Part IV, is limited by the novelty of the
legislation and the ongoing development of pertinent issues. However,
dramatic indicators of the direction in which the administration intends to take
PATRIOT exist, and these indicators will serve to guide this inquiry. This
Note ultimately aims to ascertain whether PATRIOT is a necessary evil,
spawned from the realities of combating the modern terrorist threat in today's
global environment, or whether the threat to constitutional rights is simply too
great.
courts.").
43. See Homeland Defense: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. (2001) (testimony of Attorney General Ashcroft) ("Each action taken by the Department
of Justice ... is carefully drawn to target a narrow class of individuals - terrorists. Our legal
powers are targeted at terrorists. Our investigation is focused on terrorists. Our prevention
strategy targets the terrorist threat"), available at httpJ/www.senate.gov/%/7Ejudiciary/testim
ony.cfm?id=108&witid-42 (last visited Sept. 30, 2002).
44. See 147 CoNG. REc. S10,991 (2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("Indeed, this bill will
change surveillance and intelligence procedures for all types of criminal and foreign intelligence
investigations, not just for terrorism cases.").
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Before I begin, it is important to recognize somberly the depth of the
wound 9-11 inflicted upon our nation. The images broadcast across the world
on that Tuesday morning will forever be a traumatic component of our collec-
tive consciousness. Undoubtedly, there are those who will see any challenge
to the government's efforts to combat terrorism as unpatriotic or un-American;
some may even consider this commentary "ammunition to America's enemies,
and pause to America's friends."4 However, even the staunchest proponents
of PATRIOT agree that "American rights and freedoms... must be preserved
throughout this war on terrorism." '46 It would seem surprising, then, that
anyone seriously would oppose an effort to ensure that the United States
wages this new war with "a total commitment to protect the rights and privacy
of all Americans and the constitutional protections we hold dear."'4 Thus, as
I endeavor to participate in "honest, reasoned debate; not fearmongering,"
48
I take great comfort in the knowledge that I may do so "without people ques-
tioning [my] patriotism, seriousness or opposition to bad guys."
49
I Judicial Framework for National Security Electronic Surveillance
A. Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment
The swiftness with which the world became aware of the 9-11 tragedy
evidences the gargantuan capabilities of modem conununication technology.
Every day, we become more and more intertwined, perhaps inextricably, with
communication and information technology."0 All elements of society -
savory and otherwise - have begun to take advantage of the dramatic innova-
tions that now are so frequent that they receive little notice. Just as this
technology has allowed for the rapid and widespread dissemination of infor-
mation, it equally has facilitated the clandestine accumulation of informa-
tion." Electronic surveillance has become a crucial tool for modem law
45. Hearing on DOJ Oversight, supra note I (statement of John Ashcroft, Attorney
General).
46. Hearing on Anti-Terrorism Legislation, supra note 17 (statement of John Ashcroft,
Attorney General).
47. Id.
48. Hearing on DOJ Oversigh4 supra note 1 (statement of John Ashcroft, Attorney
Genera).
49. Protecting Constitutional Freedoms, supra note 36 (statement of Grover Norquist,
President, Americans for Tax Reform).
50. See Young, supra note 25, at 1024-25 (discussing prevalence of communications
technology in all aspects of life in United States).
51. See Blown Away, supra note 20, at 2088-89 ("Modem technology has made the
accumulation of sensitive personal information startlingly easy." (citing GARY T. MARX,
UNDERcovER: PoucE SURVEiLANCE IN AMERICA 217-29 (1988); Matthew M. Kleiman,
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enforcement and intelligence gathering; 2 both law enforcement and intelli-
gence services continuously have sought faster, subtler, and more effective
means to gather information about suspected evil-doers. 3
Courts have struggled to stay abreast of the competing advancements in
communication and surveillance technology. Unfortunately, judicial efforts
to reconcile the capabilities of modem technology with traditional Fourth
Amendment values have done little to dismantle the longstanding, palpable
tension that developed between efforts to protect our nation and endeavors to
safeguard the individual liberties guaranteed under the Constitution.' This
tension is particularly pronounced in the protracted and exceedingly opaque
jurisprudence regarding the Fourth Amendment's application to electronic
surveillance."5 Although an in-depth historical consideration of the Fourth
Amendment is beyond the scope of this Note, 6 an understanding of the prin-
Comment, The Right to Financial Privacy Versus Computerized Law Enforcement: A New
Fight in an Old Battle, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1169,1176-78 (1992))).
52. See Young, supra note 25, at 1025 ("[T]he prevailing view is aptly summarized by
one hornbook which states: 'Wiretapping and eavesdropping are among the most effective
techniques available to combat crime.'" (quoting CUFORD S. FISHMA & ANNE T. MCKENNA,
WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING 1:1, at 1-3 (2d ed. 1995))).
53. See id. (providing overview of sophisticated array of surveillance technologies
available to law enforcement and intelligence communities).
54. See United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 596 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc) ("Among
the more perplexing dilemmas faced by a democratic society is that of securing its territorial and
institutional integrity, while at the same time, preserving intact the core of liberties essential to
its existence as an association of truly free individuals."); see also Reimers, supra note 25, at
75 (discussing judiciary's attempt to balance privacy rights with government's need for
information). Lt. Reimers noted:
The consideration [of] the relationship between the federal government's need to
accumulate information concerning activities within the United States of foreign
powers and the people's right of privacy as embodied in statute and the Fourth
Amendment, represents, in effect, part of the federal judiciary's attempt to strike a
proper balance between these two compelling, albeit not easily reconciled, interests.
Id. (citation omitted); Sievert, supra note 16, at 1422 (noting that courts arc arbiters between
competing demands for security and protection of individual liberties); Young, supra note 25,
at 1019-20 (noting opposing reactions to 9-11 "illustrate the battle as old as the country over
the proper balance between granting the government authority to maintain order in society and
restraining the government from intruding on personal liberties").
55. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
757-58 (1994) ("The Fourth Amendment today is... a vast jumble ofjudicial pronouncements
that is not merely complex and contradictory, but often perverse. Criminals go free, while
honest citizens are intruded upon in outrageous ways with little or no real remedy.").
56. This Part draws extensively from Americo R. Cinquegrana's excellent article: The
Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, supra note 33. The reader can find a more thorough treatment of the
development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence leading up to FISA therein. See Sievert,
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ciples underlying the federal judiciary's Fourth Amendment decisions pertain-
ing to electronic surveillance is vital to a proper evaluation of PATRIOT. Fur-
ther, FISA is a direct descendant of this case-law, 7 and as this Note discusses
in Part IV, the changes to this important statute present PATRIOT's chief
constitutional hazard.5' Finally, tracing the inability of the law to keep up with
technological advances that refuse to slow down emphasizes the magnitude of
the challenge our nation faces in trying to wage a war against modem terrorism
without sacrificing essential American ideals.59
B. Early Judicial Reactions to Electronic Surveillance: From Olmstead to
Katz; From Property to Privacy
Throughout the first quarter ofthe twentieth century, the executive branch
of the federal government utilized wiretaps and electronic listening devices
without warrants as an effective method for discovering and combating crmi-
nal activity, as well as for gathering intelligence information.' The issue of
whether such activity comported with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures did not come before the Supreme Court
until 1928, in Olmstead v. United States.61 Therein, the Justices considered
supra note 16, at 1428 (considering complications arising from meeting challenge of modem
terrorism under strictures of traditional Fourth Amendment notions); Young, supra note 25, at
1017-95 (providing in-depth account of United States surveillance technologies and constitu-
tional issues associated therewith).
57. See Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 803 ("[T]he Court's explanation.., regarding the
flexibility that would be permissible under the [F]ourth [A]mendment paved the way for FISA
and its carefully tailored provisions for surveillance of foreign powers and their agents in the
United States."); Sievert, supra note 16, at 1436-37 (discussing Supreme Court's implicit
invitation to Congress to pass legislation governing national security surveillance procedures
in Keith and noting that "Congress accepted the Court's invitation and passed FISA").
58. See infra Part IV (discussing changes PATRIOT brings to NSA).
59. See Young, supra note 25, at 1020 (commenting on "the potential risks facing our
society, given increasingly sophisticated technologies, and given our substantial and growing
dependence on communications, transactions, and other activities which leave some kind of data
trail").
60. See Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 795 (discussing executive use of wiretaps in early
twentieth century America).
61. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-65 (1928) (holding Fourth
Amendment inapplicable to wiretaps). In Olmstead, the Supreme Court considered whether
evidence obtained by wiretapping violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Id. at 455. The
Court carefully reviewed prior holdings on the Fourth Amendment and the Amendment's
history. Id. at 458-64. The Court found that the Fourth Amendment applied to material things,
such as a house, papers, etc., but that "[t]he language of the Amendment can not be extended
and expanded to include telephone wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant's
house or office." Id. at 464-65. According to the majority, while Congress could establish such
protection, the courts could not. Id. at 465-66. Therefore, the Court concluded "that the wire
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE WAR ON TERROR 935
whether evidence from telephone conversations, surreptitiously intercepted by
law enforcement officials without a warrant, was admissible in a criminal
trial.62 In a harbinger of things to come, the issue deeply divided the Court.63
Ultimately, the Justices endorsed a textual interpretation ofthe Fourth Amend-
ment and refused to extend its protection to wiretaps.' 4 In a five-to-four
decision, the Court admitted the Government's evidence and effectively
"removed electronic surveillance techniques not involving physical intrusions
from [F]ourth [A]mendment scrutiny for almost ten years."'65
The decision in Olmstead, while facilitating the executive's continued
use of warrantless surveillance, also piqued the interest of Congress in regulat-
ing the procedure for obtaining surveillance authorization.' In 1934, Con-
gress passed the Federal Communications Act, making the "interception and
tapping [in question] did not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 466. In a strong, progressive dissent, Justice Brandeis noted the hypocrisy
of the Court's holding considering the Court's willingness to endorse an expansive reading of
the Constitution with respect to the exercise of power by Congress. Id. at 471-72 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). According to Brandeis, the Fourth Amendment's protection must evolve with the
world around it. Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For Justice Brandeis, "[t]he evil incident
to invasion of the privacy of the telephone is far greater than that involved in tampering with
the mails." Id. at 475 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Therefore, concluded Brandeis, the Court
should have found the government's wiretaps to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
at 488 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
62. See id. at 455 (noting issue as "whether the use of evidence of private telephone con-
versations between the defendants and others, intercepted by means of wiretapping, amounted
to a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments").
63. See Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 795 (noting that "Olmstead resulted in a sharp
5-4 division").
64. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464 (refusing to interpret Fourth Amendment as protecting
defendant from warrantless wiretapping). The majority stated:
The language of the amendment cannot be extended and expanded to include
telephone wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant's house or
office.... Congress may of course protect the secrecy of telephone messages by
making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials,
by direct legislation, and thus depart from the common law of evidence. But the
courts may not adopt such a policy by attributing an enlarged and unusual meaning
to the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 465-66. In dissent, Justice Brandeis pointed to the hypocrisy of the majority opinion
when contrasted with the Court's willingness to sustain "the exercise of power by Congress,
under various clauses of [the Constitution], over objects of which the Fathers could not have
dreamed." Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis asserted that the constitutional
protections of individual liberties "must have a similar capacity of adaptation to a changing
world." Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
65. Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 796.
66. See id. (noting that decision in Olmstead "stir[red] congressional interest in regulating
the technique [of electronic surveillance] and broadening individual protections").
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disclosure of any wire or radio communication" illegal. 67 Although the legis-
lation barred the introduction of electronic surveillance evidence in a criminal
trial, it did little to halt the practice of warrantless surveillance because the
executive regarded the statute, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it,
as "preventing [the] use of electronic surveillance only when it was combined
with disclosure of its fruits outside of the goverrmnent." t s Congress's first
attempt to curb executive surveillance thus proved wholly inadequate and the
unchecked wiretapping continued. 69
Although there were tangential judicial encroachments, ° it was not until
1967, when the Supreme Court reevaluated the electronic surveillance issue
in Katz v. United States,7' that the executive's autonomy endured any real
constraint.7 Katz gave the Court an opportunity to reconsider its traditional
67. Id. at 797 (citing The Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, Pub. L. No. 73-
416, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103-04 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp. M 1985))).
68. Id.
69. See id. at 799 ("[A]lmost 7000 wiretaps and 2200 microphone surveillances were used
by the Executive between 1940 and the mid-1960s in internal security investigations... as well
as major criminal activities.").
70. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-12 (1961) (finding that electronic
eavesdropping accomplished by "spike microphone" violated Fourth Amendment).
71. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
72. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,358-59 (1967) (holding warrant precondition
to electronic surveillance under Fourth Amendment). In Katz, the Court considered the consti-
tutional questions presented by the denial of a defendant's motion to suppress evidence of
conversations obtained by the FBI by means of "an electronic listening and recording device
attached to the outside of the public telephone booth from which [the defendant] had placed his
calls." Id. at 348-49. The Court first dismissed both the prosecution's suggested construction
of the Fourth Amendment in terms of a "constitutionally protected area" and the defendant's
idea that the Fourth Amendment "translate[s] into a general constitutional 'right to privacy.'"
Id. at 350-51. Instead, the Court asserted that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places" and that what one "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52. The Court concluded that the Government's
actions in "electronically listening to and recording the [defendant's] words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search
and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 353. Thus, according to the
Court, the issue was "whether the search and seizure ... complied with constitutional stan-
dards." Id. at 354. The Court concluded that had the Government applied for a warrant, a court
likely would have authorized the surveillance. Id. 354-56. However, that fact was insufficient
to excuse the absence of authorization by a "neutral magistrate." Id. at 356. According to the
Court, surveillance without "adherence to judicial processes" and "prior approval by a judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 357 (citations omit-
ted). Because the Government did not obtain such neutral authorization, the Court concluded
that the surveillance in question violated the Fourth Amendment Id. at 358-59. In footnote 23,
the majority expressly declined to address whether the ruling applied with equal force to
"situation[s] involving the national security." Id. at 358 n.23.
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property rights based interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in light of the
emerging threat to civil liberties posed by modem surveillance technologies.73
Katz was a turning point in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that ultimately
would lay the foundation for the modem statutory approach to both criminal
and national security surveillance procedures. 4
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart overruled the Olmsteadtrespass
requirement and announced an entirely new paradigm for delineating the
Fourth Amendment's protections. Although conceding that the Constitution
does not guarantee a general right to privacy," Stewart nevertheless opined
that it protects some expectations of privacy:
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, maybe constitutionally
protected.76
Justice Stewart concluded that the non-invasive electronic surveillance with
which the Government surreptitiously acquired its evidence was a search and,
as such, was subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment.77 With Katz, the Court expanded the Fourth Amendment's protections
to account for the new capabilities of surveillance technology.
Once the Court identified the Government's conduct as a "search," the
question remained whether the search was reasonable.7" The Court found the
search unreasonable, grounding its decision, in part, on the constitutional
mandate that some judicial interposition exist between "citizens and the
police." 79 The Court explicitly refused to validate the Govermnent's actions
retroactively, despite the fact that the surveillance at issue likely deserved a
proper warrant.8" Echoing the principles underlying the Court's other then-
73. See Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 800 (discussing Katz).
74. See id. at 800-01 ("In enacting Title Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act, Congress drew upon principles discussed in the Katz decision."); id. at 800 ("The
Court's gratuitous discussion in Katz regarding surveillance activities undertaken in furtherance
of national security interests was critical to the development of FISA.").
75. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
76. Id. at 351 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
77. See id. at 353 (finding Government's actions to be "'search and seizure' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment").
78. Id. at 354.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 356-57 (noting that magistrate would have accommodated Government's
"carefully limited" surveillance, but that because Government obtained no such order, surveil-
lance violated Fourth Amendment).
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recent Fourth Amendment decisions,8' Justice Stewart found the Government's
self-imposed restraint an inadequate safeguard and refused to justify a search
"upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a
particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive
means consistent with that end."'  The Court drew a line in the sand and
declared that any search conducted without prior judicial approval would be
"per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,"83 except in certain spe-
cific situations. 4
Justice Stewart's pronouncement was momentous in that it provided the
first principle for determining the constitutionality of govermnent surveillance:
the presence of prior judicial authorization. However, the most important facet
of Katz for purposes of this Note is not in the text of the opinion itself, but in
footnote 23 and in the concurring opinions of Justices Douglas and White.8
Justice Stewart's footnote excluded national security surveillance from the rule
of law fashioned in his opinion, explicitly leaving open the question of what
Fourth Amendment principles should apply to such situations."6
The ambivalence of the footnote 23 disclaimer did not sit well with some
of Justice Stewart's peers. On the one hand, Justice Douglas felt that the
footnote provided an "unwarranted green light for the executive branch to
resort to electronic eavesdropping without a warrant in cases which the execu-
tive branch itself labels 'national security' matters."8" On the other hand,
Justice White believed the majority opinion did not go far enough and that the
Court should endorse affirmatively an exception to the Fourth Amendment for
81. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (discussing Fourth Amend-
ment protections). The Johnson Court noted:
The point of the Fourth Amendment.. . is not that it denies law enforcement the
support of the usual inference which reasonable men draw from the evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id.
82. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,357 (1967).
83. Id. at 357.
84. National security was conspicuously absent from the exceptions noted by Justice
Stewart. See id. at 357-58 (noting electronic surveillance unlikely to be incident to arrest and
unjustifiable on grounds of hot pursuit).
85. See Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 800 (noting footnote 23 and concurrences as
"critical to the development of FISA").
86. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 n.23 ("Whether safeguards other than prior authorization
by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national
security is a question not presented by this case.").
87. Id. at 359 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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the President and the Attorney General when acting i the interests of national
security."a The sharp division in the Court regarding the principles applicable
in the national security context was a portent, only five years later, the Justices
addressed the issue directly.
However, before the Court returned to the issue of national security
surveillance, Congress reacted to the Katz decision with another attempt to
regulate executive surveillance: Title m of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act (Title II).9 Congress intended Title II to provide the frame-
work for obtaining court-ordered surveillance authority in criminal investiga-
tions; it "represent[ed] a comprehensive attempt by Congress to promote more
effective control of crime while protecting the privacy of individual thought
and expression. '  In Title III, Congress set forth an elaborate probable cause
requirement such that a warrant for electronic surveillance could issue only
when the reviewing judge:
[D]etermine[d] on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that -
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in
section 2516 of this chapter,
(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications con-
cerning that offense will be obtained through such interception;
(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too danger-
ous;
(d) except as provided in subsection (11), there is probable cause to believe
that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, oral, or
electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are
about to be used in connection with the commission of such offense, or
are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person.9'
88. See id. at 364 (White, J., concurring) ("We should not require the warrant procedure
and the magistrate's judgment if the President of the United States or his chief legal officer, the
Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic
surveillance as reasonable.").
89. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000)); see United States v. United
States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 302 (1972) (noting that "[m]uch of Title HI was drawn to meet
the constitutional requirements for electronic surveillance enunciated by this Court in ... Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)"); Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 800-01 ("In 1968,
Congress accepted the judicial and executive invitation, outstanding since Olmstead, to define
more clearly the proper use of electronic surveillance techniques in criminal investigations. In
enacting Title MI of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Congress drew upon
principles discussed in the Katz decision.").
90. United States v. United States Dist. Ct, 407 U.S. 297, 302 (1972).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2000).
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Unfortunately, Congress also was unwilling to weigh in conclusively on
the applicability of the Title ll standard to executive surveillance for national
security' and reiterated the Katz Court's deference:
Nothing contained in this chapter... shall limit the constitutional power
of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the
Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign
power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the
security of the United States, or to protect national security information
against foreign intelligence activities.93
Not surprisingly, the executive branch interpreted the Title III disclaimer,
together with the Katz Court's implicit exclusion of national security mea-
sures, as allowing total executive autonomy in devising and implementing
surveillance procedures for internal security missions; the executive reasoned
that in such situations the carefully crafted principles governing criminal sur-
veillance simply did not apply." In effect, Congress and the Court "perpetu-
ated the ability of the executive branch to occupy the field and conduct
electronic surveillance without prior judicial review when [it] deemed neces-
sary. 195
C. The Keith Case and Lower Court Interpretations: Framing the
Foreign Intelligence Exception
Executive authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance in the
name of national security finally met a serious challenge in 1972 when the
Supreme Court decided United States v. United States District Court for the
92. See Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 801 ("Congress, like the Supreme Court, was not
prepared in 1968 to regulate the executive's claim of inherent power to conduct warrantless
electronic surveillance for national security purposes.").
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (2000); see also Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 801 (noting that
Title MI "specifically disclaimed any intention that its provisions, or those of the 1934 Commu-
nications Act, should be read to affect the constitutional powers of the President to protect the
United States against hostile foreign powers, to obtain foreign intelligence information,.., or
to guard against any other 'clear and present danger'").
94. See United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1972) (noting
government's reliance on § 2511(3) disclaimer to justify warrantless surveillance of defendants
suspected of bombing federal buildings); Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 801 (describing
executive branch interpretation of Title M provision as "tacit congressional acceptance" of
executive authority to conduct surveillance activities related to national security).
95. Id. After the passage of Title 1I, "it appear[ed] that the only limitations on the
President's authority to engage in some forms of electronic surveillance [were] those set forth
in the Constitution." United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 600 n.25 (3d Cir. 1974) (en
bane).
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE WAR ON TERROR 941
Eastern District ofMichigan," also known as the Keith case.' In Keith, the
Supreme Court considered the Title m national security disclaimer" and, for
the first time, directly addressed the ultimate question of presidential authority
to conduct warrantless surveillance operations in the name of national
security." At the outset of his majority opinion, Justice Powell asserted the
magnitude and difficulty of the issue before the Court:
The issue before us is an important one for the people of our country and
their Government. It involves the delicate question of the President's
power, acting through the Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveil-
lance in internal security matters without priorjudicial approval. [RIesolu-
tion [of the issue] is a matter of national concern, requiring sensitivity both
96. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
97. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 303 (1972) [hereinafter Keith]
(holding that Title I was not grant of power to executive in national security cases and that
electronic surveillance in domestic security investigation requires prior judicial approval). In
Keith, the Court directly faced the question of whether the President could "authorize electronic
surveillance in internal security matters without prior judicial approval." Id. at 299. The Court
first examined the procedures for obtaining a warrant for criminal surveillance under Title M.
Id. at 301-02. In particular, the Court considered language in the statute specifically referring
to constitutional authority of the President to protect national security, on which the Govern-
ment relied to justify its warrantless surveillance. Id. at 302. The Court concluded that rather
than providing the President with a statutory exemption to the Title M11 warrant requirement the
language of the statute was merely an effort by Congress to leave "presidential powers where
it found them." Id. at 303. Thus, the Court reasoned, the executive could not rely on the statute
to support the surveillance in question. Id. at 308. "Rather, we must look to the constitutional
powers of the President." Id. Before examining the executive's constitutional power with
respect to the instant case, the Court asserted that it did not address "the scope of the President's
surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or without this
country." Id. The Keith Court noted that the question it addressed was the one left open by
Katz: "whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the
Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security." Id. at 309 (quoting Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347,358 n.23 (1967)). The Court recognized the tremendous interest
of the government in national security cases, but asserted that it must balance this interest with
the Fourth Amendment's protections. Id. at 312-15. The Court concluded that, in the instant
case, "the Government's concerns [did] not justify departure... from the customary Fourth
Amendment requirement ofjudicial approval prior to initiation of a search or surveillance." Id.
at 321. However, before ending its opinion the Court asserted that Congress may prescribe
warrant procedures more suited to the requirements of national security than those of Tide I
that may, if reasonable, comport with the Fourth Amendment Id. at 322-324; see also
Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 802 ("The seminal case in the development of the law of
national security surveillance, however, proved to be the so-called 'Keith' case.. ").
98. Keith, 407 U.S. at 302-08 (noting Government's reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) and
considering import of provision).
99. See id. at 299 (stating that case "involves the delicate question of the President's
power. . . to authorize electronic surveillance in internal security matters without prior judicial
approval").
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to the Government's right to protect itself from unlawful subversion and
attack and to the citizen's right to be secure in his privacy against unrea-
sonable government intrusion.
10
In Keith, the Government charged the defendants, all of whom were
United States citizens, in connection with the bombing of a Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) office in Michigan.' I The Government's indictment
stemmed from evidence obtained through a wiretap authorized by the Attor-
ney General but initiated with no judicial involvement or approval.1°2 In
defense of the warrantless surveillance, the Government relied on Congress's
disclaimer in Title III and asserted that it undertook the surveillance pursuant
to the President's constitutional powers to protect national security. 03 Both
the district court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed with
the Government and held that the surveillance was unlawful under the Fourth
Amendment.
104
In considering the Government's appeal, the Supreme Court looked
closely at the overall structure of Title HI, but focused particularly on the
provision disclaiming any impact on the "constitutional power of the President
to take measures" in the interest of national security.' This examination led
the Court to conclude that the language and history of the legislation did not
support the Government's assertion of implicit congressional authority.' °6
Instead, the Court interpreted the Title HI disclaimer as "Congress simply
[leaving] presidential powers where it found them."o7 The Court noted that
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) did not "employ[ I the standard language of exception' 't
and cited the legislative history of Title Ill: "We are not affirmatively confer-
ring any power upon the President. We are simply saying that nothing herein
shall limit such power as the President has under the Constitution. We cer-
tainly do not grant him a thing."'1 9 Based on such a clear assertion of congres-
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 300-01 (describing background of case).
103. See id. at 301-02 (noting Government's reliance on § 2511(3) and asserting "that the
sureveillance [sic] was lawful, though conducted without prior judicial approval, as a reasonable
exercise of the President's power (exercised through the Attorney General) to protect the
national security").
104. See id. at 301 (recounting procedural history of case).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3); see Keith, 407 U.S. at 301-08 (discussing Title ll generally and
disclaimer in § 2511(3) specifically).
106. See id. at 303 (concluding that "the language of § 2511(3), as well as the legislative
history of the statute, refutes [the Government's] interpretation").
107. Id.
108. Id. at 304.
109. Id. at 306-07 (emphasis omitted).
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sional neutrality, the Court held that the Government could not rely on the
Title III disclaimer to support the surveillance at issue."0
When the statutory argument failed, the Court next considered whether
the Government could rely upon the executive's inherent constitutional pow-
ers."' The question before the Court was the very one Justice Stewart de-
clined to address in Katz: whether prior judicial authorization was a constitu-
tional prerequisite for national security surveillance." 2 Justice Powell's
majority opinion recognized that the answer to this question lies in the Fourth
Amendment's requirement that all searches be reasonable and "the way in
which 'reasonableness' derives content and meaning through reference to the
warrant clause."'"
The Court was quite sensitive to the particularly strong governmental
interest in protecting national security" 4 and the difficulty of meeting this task
in the modem world.1" On the other hand, the Court noted that "[tlhere is,
understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and apprehension that [electronic
surveillance] capability will be used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law-
abiding citizens."" 6 The challenge for the Court involved balancing the
necessity of ensuring national security against the threat to individual liberties
posed by unchecked executive surveillance authority."7
In weighing these competing interests, Powell's opinion expanded the
principles that would guide all three branches of the federal government in the
application of the Fourth Amendment to national security electronic surveil-
lance."' Powell noted that national security cases present a particularly
110. See id. at 308 (holding that Title Il "is not the measure of the executive authority
asserted in this case").
111. See id. (noting that Court must look to constitutional source to derive executive's
authority).
112. See id. at 309 (noting that Katz Court did not answer question of "[wihether safe-
guards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in
a situation involving the national security" (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358
n.23 (1967))).
113. Id at 309-10 (citation omitted).
114. See id. at 312 (noting that "unless the Government safeguards its own capacity to
function and to preserve the security of its people, society itself could become so disordered that
all rights and liberties would be endangered").
115. See id. at 311-12 (noting that "covertness and complexity of potential unlawful
conduct" made electronic surveillance techniques particularly important and that "[ilt would be
contrary to the public interest for the Government to deny itself' such tools).
116. Id. at 312.
117. See id. at 314-15 (noting that Court's "task [was] to examine and balance the basic
values at stake in [the] case: the duty of Government to protect the domestic security, and the
potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and free expression").
118. See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 72 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that decision in
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prickly situation because of the tremendous governmental interest" 9 and the
likelihood of both unreasonable invasions of privacy and jeopardy to free
speech rights."' Although he recognized the vital importance of protecting
the national security, Justice Powell's primary concern was ensuring the
sanctity of political dissent - both public and private - in determining the
application of the Fourth Amendment to national security surveillance."'
For Powell, the Fourth Amendment had to serve as "an important work-
ing part of our machinery of government, operating... to check the 'well-
intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers.'"2 This constitu-
tional function could not be guaranteed when domestic security surveillance
was left entirely to the discretion of the executive: "[U]nreviewed executive
discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence
and overlook potential invasions ofprivacy and protected speech."'"3 Thus,
the Court reiterated its assertion in Katz that some interposition of the judi-
ciary between citizens and law enforcement must exist. 24
The Court noted and carefully considered the Government's argument in
favor of a blanket exception to the Fourth Amendment for national security
situations." Nevertheless, the majority concluded that "the Government's
concerns do not justify departure in this case from the customary Fourth
Keith "made clear that the requirements of the Fourth Amendment may change" depending on
governmental interests and that interests in national security context are "substantially different"
from those in criminal investigations).
119. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 312 (noting that without national security, all constitutional
liberties are at risk).
120. See id. at 313 ('National security cases, moreover, often reflect a convergence of First
and Fourth Amendment values not present in cases of 'ordinary' crime. Though the investiga-
tive duty of the executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is there a greater jeopardy to
constitutionally protected speech.").
121. See id. at 314 (discussing political dissent). Justice Powell noted:
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an un-
checked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdrop-
ping deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private
conversation. For private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential
to our free society.
Id.
122. Id. at 316 (citation omitted).
123. Id. at 316-17 (emphasis added).
124. See id. at 317 (noting that while surveillance at issue may have been entirely reason-
able, Court had never let this fact excuse lack of judicial involvement prior to surveillance); id.
at 318 (noting that judicially created exceptions to warrant requirement did not dilute principle
of obtaining warrant prior to surveillance whenever practicable).
125. See id. at 319-20 (noting pragmatic force of arguments for exception to Fourth
Amendment in domestic national security situations).
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Amendment requirement of judicial approval prior to initiation of a search or
surveillance. " 6 However, Powell carefully limited the scope of the opinion
as follows:
We have not addressed, and express no opinion as to, the issues which may
be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents ....
Moreover, we do not hold that the same type of standards and procedures
prescribed by Title IMl are necessarily applicable to [domestic security]
case[s].... Congress may wish to consider protective standards for [such
cases] which differ from those already prescribed... in Title Ill. Different
standards maybe compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reas-
onable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelli-
gence information and the protected rights of our citizens.'27
Essentially, the Court asserted that legislative action could adapt the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement to the specific needs of the governmental
interests in question, but that any search must be reasonable."
Keith opened the door to modern national security law and Congress
eventually accepted the Court's implicit invitation to legislate by enacting
FISA. 29 The issue before the Court in Keith, however, was surveillance for
domestic security operations; 3 the Court explicitly left open an important
window for a foreign intelligence exception.' Because the Court did not
settle the ultimate issue of national security surveillance of an American citi-
zen in a foreign intelligence context, important developments in the lower
courts helped to shape FISA.'32 The Supreme Court has never specifically
endorsed the existence of a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth
Amendment,"'33 but every lower court that has addressed the issue seized upon
126. Id. at 321.
127. Id. at321-23.
128. See id. at 323 ("For the warrant application may vary according to the governmental
interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection.").
129. See Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 802 ("The seminal case in the development of the
law of national security surveillance, however, proved to be the so-called 'Keith' case, United
States v. United States District Court, decided by the Supreme Court in 1972.").
130. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 299 (noting that surveillance at issue regarded internal security
matters).
131. See id. at 308 (noting that "the instant case requires no judgment on the scope of the
President's surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers").
132. See Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 803-04 ("The Supreme Court in Keith had not
addressed the legality of warrantless electronic surveillance undertaken by the Executive for
genuine national security purposes. Lower federal courts, however, continued to grapple with
this issue and their opinions also made important contributions to the shaping of FISA_").
133. Reimers, supra note 25, at 71.
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Keith 's disclaimer and endorsed just such an exception.134 Nevertheless, these
courts struggled to reconcile the decision in Keith with the Court's other eval-
uations of the extent of executive prerogative in national security matters."'
The most essential development from the cases defining the foreign
intelligence exception is the "primary purpose doctrine. '"' The primary pur-
pose doctrine asserts that "prior judicial authorization [is] not required" only
when surveillance is "conducted and maintained solely for the purpose of gath-
ering foreign intelligence information."' 37 However, review of a warrantless
surveillance must affirmatively determine 'tat [securing foreign intelligence
information] was in fact [the search's] primary purpose and that the accumula-
tion of evidence of criminal activity was incidental.""' Such surveillance still
is subject to the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. 39 The
import of this statement is that warrantless electronic surveillance in contra-
vention ofthe primary purpose doctrine is repugnant to the Fourth Amendment
of the Constitution.
140
United States v. TruongDinhHung 4 presents a particularly enlightening
discussion of the primary purpose doctrine. In Truong, the Court of Appeals
134. See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59,72 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Prior to the enactment
of FISA, virtually every court that had addressed the issue had concluded that... warrantless
electronic surveillance to colect foreign intelligence information ... constituted an exception
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment").
135. See United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593,602-03 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc) (discuss-
ing Keith in relation to other decisions of Court). The Third Circuit noted that:
The expansive language of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation
provides support for the contention that the President is authorized to act unencum-
bered by the Fourth Amendment requirements of prior judicial approval and
probable cause when he is dealing with national security matters. The ramifications
of Curtis-Wright, however, remain somewhat enigmatic in this regard. To contend
that customary Fourth Amendment analysis is to be abandoned whenever the
President asserts that a particular search and seizure is incident to the conduct of
foreign affairs activities is arguably uncongenial with a reasoned view of the
relationship among the relevant constitutional provisions and the thrust of the
Supreme Court decision in [Keith]. We take no such position here.
Id.
136. See Reimers, supra note 25, at 83 (noting that Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
created national security exception "standard applicable to all U.S. persons which came to be
known as the primary purpose doctrine").
137. Butenko, 494 F.2d at 605 (internal quotation marks omitted).
138. Id. at 606.
139. See id. at 605-06 (noting that post-search judicial review often will be necessary to
safeguard defendant's Fourth Amendment rights).
140. See id. ("The opportunity for post-search judicial review represents an important
safeguard of Fourth Amendment rights.').
141. 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
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for the Fourth Circuit struggled withthe issue of how to treat evidence obtained
in an investigation that served both prosecutorial and intelligence-gathering
ends.142 In so doing, the court recognized the criticality of the purposes of an
investigation to the application of the Fourth Amendment. 43 Writing for the
majority, Judge Winter espoused the primary purpose doctrine:
[Tihe executive should be excused from securing a warrant only when the
surveillance is conducted "primarily" for foreign intelligence reasons....
[O]nce surveillance becomes primarily a criminal investigation, the courts
are entirely competent to make the usual probable cause determination, and
because, importantly, individual privacy interests come to the fore and
government foreign policy concerns recede.... We thus rejectthe govern-
ment's assertion that, if surveillance is to any degree directed at gathering
foreign intelligence, the executive may ignore the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment.1
44
Judge Winters noted, however, that a test requiring that surveillance be solely
for foreign intelligence purposes was equally unacceptable because many in-
vestigations that begin as foreign intelligence culminate in criminal prosecu-
tions.
145
Thus, although the decision in Truong explicitly recognized the existence
of the foreign intelligence exception and acknowledged the constraints im-
posed on the exception by the primary purpose doctrine, it left the parameters
of the doctrine ill-defined.146  Without any clear guidelines as to when
142. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 931 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that
warrantless surveillance in espionage case did not violate Fourth Amendment). In Truong, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered an appeal from defendants convicted of
espionage. Id. at 911. Specifically, the court considered the defendants' contention that
evidence obtained by warrantless electronic surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment Id.
The court disagreed with the defendants' assertion and concluded that "the Executive Branch
need not always obtain a warrant for foreign intelligence surveillance." Id. at 913. According
to the court, the extraordinary interests of the executive in the foreign intelligence realm merited
this exception. Id. The court went on, however, to carefully limit the exception to surveillance
with a direct connection to "a foreign power, its agent or collaborators." Id. at 915. "When
there is no foreign connection, the Executive's needs become less compelling; and the surveil-
lance more closely resembles the surveillance of suspected criminals, which must be authorized
by warrant" Id. Thus, the court explicitly endorsed the primary purpose doctrine. Id. Because
the surveillance at issue met the mandate of the primary purpose doctrine, the Government's
evidence was admissible and the court affirmed the defendants' conviction. Id. at 931.
143. See id. at 915 (noting that "the executive should be excused from securing a warrant
only when the surveillance is conducted 'primarily' for foreign intelligence reasons").
144. Id.
145. See id. at 915-16 (noting that "there is always the possibility that the targets of the
[national security] investigation will be prosecuted for criminal violations").
146. The surveillance at issue in Truong occurred before SA's enactment, but the Fourth
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warrantless surveillance was constitutional, the executive faced a difficult
choice: it could undertake surveillance without a warrant and jeopardize any
subsequent prosecution; or it could seek a traditional warrant and risk the sur-
veillance itself. Rather than solving it, the primary purpose doctrine added yet
another dimension to the vexing problem of how to reconcile the necessities
of national security surveillance with the Fourth Amendment.
11. Modem National Security Surveillance Before September 11th:
Fleshing Out FISA
A. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislative Reconciliation
of the Fourth Amendment and National Security Surveillance
1. Development
Arguably, one could attribute the same level of ambiguity present in the
primary purpose doctrine to the entirety of the judiciary's treatment of na-
tional security surveillance. The founding principle asserted in Katz - that
judicial review for probable cause should precede any surveillance to ensure
Circuit did not hand down a decision in the case until after the legislation took effect. Id. at 914
n.4. In a footnote, the court remarked upon the statute and offered a fairly in-depth judicial
consideration of the new law. Id. In the footnote, Judge Winter concluded that although FISA
mandated a warrant in some circumstances, it "does not.. . transport the traditional Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement unaltered into the foreign intelligence field." Id. Furthermore,
Judge Winter observed that the warrant procedure under FISA was substantially looser than the
requirements for issuing a standard criminal surveillance warrant, noting that for a FISA
warrant
[T]he executive need demonstrate only... that the target is a foreign power or a
foreign agent and, in the case of United States citizens and resident aliens, that the
government is not clearly erroneous in believing that the information sought is the
desired foreign intelligence information and that the information cannot be reason-
ably obtained by normal methods.
Id. (citation omitted). Judge Winter concluded his consideration of FISA by asserting the
imprudence of any judicial attempt to impose an "elaborate structure for core foreign intelli-
gence surveillance under the guise of a constitutional decision." Id. at 914-15. Despite the rev-
erence to the executive implicit in Judge Winters's footnote, the judge was not willing to ignore
completely the danger of allowing government surveillance without prior judicial approval:
[Blecause individual privacy interests are severely compromised any time the
government conducts surveillance without prior judicial approval, this foreign
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement must be
carefully limited to those situations in which the interests of the executive are
paramount.. . the government should be relieved of seeking a warrant only when
the object of the search or the surveillance is a foreign power, its agent or collabora-
tors.
Id. at 915.
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compliance with the Fourth Amendment's mandate - persisted as the baseline
for all inquiry, 47 but the Katz Court also made clear that national security sur-
veillance was an unusual creature to which the warrant requirement may not
apply.14s In Keith, the Court required the governmentto obtain judicial authori-
zation before domestic-security surveillance was constitutional, but neverthe-
less recognized that existing procedures for obtaining judicial authorization
may not be appropriate for national security cases.1 49 Additionally, in some
circumstances, the government may enjoy an exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment's warrant clause altogether. ° Truong seized on Keith's exclusionary
possibility to provide judicial support for the executive's ongoing practice of
warrantless national security surveillance, but limited the practice with the
primary purpose doctrine. This hodgepodge of judicial pronouncements
provided all ofthe pieces for FISA; the only thing absent was impetus.
Ironically, the necessary impetus for FISA's creation grew out ofthe para-
dox created by the judiciary's mixed messages. In the mid-1970s it became
clear that the executive had chosen to err on the side of breadth in interpreting
the foreign intelligence exception to the point of abuse.' Reports appeared in
the press alleging that the CIA had compiled files on thousands of American
citizens.'52 These reports led President Ford and both houses of Congress to
form investigative committees to consider the extent of executive surveillance
abuses.' 
53
147. See supra notes 72-95 and accompanying text (discussing Katz and requirement of
judicial authorization for executive surveillance).
148. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (discussing footnote 23's exclusion of
national security surveillance).
149. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 322-23 (suggesting Congress "may wish to consider" different
standards for national security surveillance and that such standards "may be compatible with the
Fourth Amendment").
150. See supra notes 96-128 and accompanying text (discussing Keith and possibility of
different warrant standards in national security context).
151. See Reimers, supra note 25, at 63 (discussing executive's abuses of exception). Lt.
Reimers notes:
Congressional involvement ... remained minimal until the mid-1970s, [when] a
series of especially troubling revelations appeared in the press concerning U.S.
Intelligence activities. Covert action programs involving assassination attempts
against foreign leaders and covert efforts to effect changes in other governments
were reported for the first time. The efforts of intelligence agencies to collect
information concerning the political activities of U.S. citizens during the late 1960s
and early 1970s were also documented extensively by the press.
Id. (quoting SELECT COMMrrrE ON INTELMGENCE, UNiTED STATES SENATE, 103D CONo., 2ND
SESS.,RE oRToNLESTLrEOvERSI GTOF INmnm.WENCEAcTnrrms: THEU.S. ExPERIEN cE
3, 4 (Comm. Print 1994)).
152. Id.
153. See id. at 64-65 (noting that Ford formed Rockefeller Commission, Senate formed
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The findings of these committees were startling. During the 1960s and
1970s, the CIA compiled a computerized database containing thousands of
records chronicling the involvement of individual participants in the domestic
antiwar movement." From these databases, the CIA "produced a steady
stream of reports to the FBI and other agencies detailing the results of its
various intelligence activities with respect to the antiwar movement."'
Between 1967 and 1973, the CIA and other intelligence agencies, as well as the
FBI, obtained and compiled the communications of over one thousand United
States citizens. 56
All of this made one fact painfully clear: The "existing legal and policy
constraints on intelligence activities were inadequate and.., proper supervi-
sion and accountability within the Executive branch and to the Congress were
sorely lacking."'57 Although Title Ill provided a framework for criminal
surveillance, the foreign intelligence exception was the creation of muddled
judicial doctrine. Congress recognized that under the then-current system,
action by the judiciary was purely remedial, and the courts essentially were
powerless to prevent executive abuses before they occurred."5 Thus, Congress
reacted to the executive's abuse of the foreign intelligence exception by
creating a system in which "the judiciary would... be involved from the
onset,""' effectively curbing the executive's ability to conduct warrantless
national security surveillance that arguably contravened constitutional require-
ments. 16°
Church Committee, and House formed Pike Committee).
154. See Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (describing CIA operation
CHAOS and its intelligence gathering methods).
155. Id.
156. See id. at 983-84 (explaining how agencies gathered this information through National
Security Agency's monitoring system).
157. Reimers, supra note 25, at 66 (quoting Stephen Saltzburg, National Security and the
Fourth and F#fth Amendments, in NATIONAL SEcunrrY LAW 1001, 1008 (John Norton Moore
et al. eds., 1990)).
158. See id. at 74 (noting that Congress was aware of "case law imposing the Fourth
Amendment on the executive branch" and knew that "courts did not get an intelligence case
until after an abuse occurred").
159. Id.; see also In re Kevork, 788 F.2d 566, 569 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that enactment
of FISA sought to balance need for adequate foreign intelligence surveillance procedures with
protection of civil liberties); Reimers, supra note 25, at 62 (noting that FISA was "the Congres-
sional reaction to executive branch violations of basic American civil liberties under the guise
of the so called 'national security exception' to the Fourth Amendment").
160. See id. at 71 (noting "the enactment of FISA... curtailed the Executive Branch's
ability to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance").
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2. Structure and Procedures
FISA did for foreign intelligence operations what Title mR had done for
traditional criminal investigations. Specifically, it "creat[ed] a secure frame-
work by which the executive branch [could] conduct legitimate electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes within the context of [the United
States'] commitment to privacy and individual rights."16 This framework
imposed several procedural hurdles for executive agents seeking surveillance
authorization under the Act.
FISA incorporates the first principle of constitutional surveillance - prior
judicial authorization - in most circumstances, 162 but the initial steps in the
procedure occur entirely within the executive branch. To obtain FISA authori-
zation, an investigating agent must first submit an application to the Office of
Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), an internal branch of DOJ, which
makes an initial determination of whether sufficient evidence exists to demon-
strate probable cause for electronic surveillance under FISA.163 If the OIPR
finds that the application presents sufficient evidence, the office submits the
application to the Attorney General for a second review.'" If the Attorney
General agrees with the OIPR that there is sufficient evidence for probable
cause, then the Attorney General must give the application official personal
approval before forwarding the matter to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) for final approval and authorization.1 6
Although FISA acknowledges the foreign intelligence exception and
allows warrantless surveillance in certain very limited circumstances,' 66 the
FISC considers the majority of executive requests for surveillance authoriza-
tion under the Act.167 Applications to the FISC must meet three primary
substantive requirements. First, the application must contain a statement of
161. United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1074 (4th Cir. 1987) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
162. See 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (1994) (requiring submission of FISA applications to federal
judge).
163. See Reimers, supra note 25, at 57 (stating that review by OIPR is first step in FISA
authorization).
164. See id. (describing next step in FISA authorization).
165. See id. (explaining steps in obtaining FISA authorization); see also 50 U.S.C.
§ 1804(b) (1994) (same).
166. See 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) (1994) (noting that Attorney General may authorize war-
rantless surveillance for up to one year by certifying under oath that surveillance at issue meets
specific requirements); id. § 1811 (authorizing warrantless surveillance for fifteen days
following declaration of war).
167. See id. § 1804(a) (noting that all FISA applications for electronic surveillance "shall
be made by a federal officer in writing upon oath or affirmation to a [FISA] judge").
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reasons to believe that 'the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power.""' Second, the application must contain information
on the manner of conduct of the surveillance, including the identity of the
target if known and proposed minimization procedures.169 Finally, a high-
ranking executive branch official must certify the application and state that he
"deems the information sought to be foreign intelligence information" and that
the government cannot obtain the information sought by other means.17 °
Several factors make the FISC's review much less stringent than Title III
review and, thus, less of a safeguard for civil liberties. First'and foremost, the
standard for probable cause under FISA is lower than that under Title I.'"
Prior to PATRIOT, FISA applications only had to show facts sufficient to
justify a belief that the target of the surveillance is a "foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power," that '"te purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign
intelligence information," and that the information is unobtainable without a
FISA warrant. 172
FISA's justification-of-belief standard contrasts sharply with Title III,
which grants a warrant only when "there is probable cause for belief that an
individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular
offense."'73 At least one commentator has argued that the multi-step progres-
sion required to obtain a warrant under FISA actually is a more stringent
process than the process under Title III.' However, this is not the majority




171. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 n.4 (4th Cir. 1980)
(noting that FISA "does not require the executive to satisfy the usual standards for the issuance
of a warrant"); Sievert supra note 16, at 1437 (noting that probable cause under FISA "con-
trasts dramatically with Title iT").
172. 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (1994).
173. Id. § 2518(3).
174. See Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 815 (noting that proponents of FISA assert that
executive branch exercises careful judgment in initial reviews to insure applications meet proper
standards before presentation to FISC); Reimers, supra note 25, at 85 (asserting that probable
cause standard under FISA "is far more demanding than the criminal standard for U.S. person
targets").
175. See United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that FISA
judge need find only that target is agent of foreign power); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d
59, 73 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that "prerequisites to [FISA] surveillance ... are less stringent
than those precedent to the issuance of a [criminal] warrant"); Truong, 629 F.2d at 915 n.4
(noting that FISA does not "require the executive to satisfy the usual standards for the issuance
of a warrant"); Protecting Constitutional Freedoms, supra note 36 (statement of Douglas W.
Kmiec, Dean of the Law School, Catholic University of America) (noting that FISA application
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surveillance.., are less stringent than those precedent to the issuance of a
[criminal] warrant.'
76
The second factor that makes FISA a more lenient hurdle is the fact that
the executive has the sole power to make the initial - and most important -
probable cause determination in the FISA process. Although the FISC makes
the final determination of probable cause as defined by FISA, this is an undeni-
ably limited role.' 7  The reviewing FISC judge ascertains only whether the
executive's certification that the government is undertaking the surveillance
to obtain foreign intelligence information is "clearly erroneous.' 1 78 Once the
Attorney General certifies that the surveillance seeks foreign intelligence
information, it is presumed that the representations made in support of the
certification are valid 79 and the application is "subjected to only minimal
scrutiny by the courts." ' Thus, although the probable cause verification is
nominally ajudicial responsibility, the executive has sole authorityto make the
substantive determination and the FISC is obliged to accept it.'5 ' This clearly
relaxes the level of scrutiny applied in the probable cause determination as
compared to review under Title I. In addition, this procedure arguably
eviscerates any purported adherence to the first guiding principle for surveil-
lance - that there be a judicial officer interposed between citizens and the
police.1
82
The final aspect of FISA that makes it at once so appealing to prosecutors
and so troublesome to civil libertarians is the secrecy which inheres in the
process.'83 It hardly is surprising that FISA procedures often are intentionally
must show that "information sought is foreign intelligence information," but that "as against
foreign powers or agents thereof," it need not demonstrate probable cause). The plain language
of the two statutes controverts the assertion that FISA is more stringent. Title III requires that
a crime is being, has been, or is about to be committed and that evidence of this criminal activity
likely will be obtained. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1994). FISA, on the other hand, only requires
a showing that a crime may be committed and that the surveillance seeks foreign intelligence
information. See Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 816 (noting FISA standard that crime "may
be" committed).
176. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73 (2d Cir. 1984).
177. See id. at 75 (noting that FISC is not "to make findings" on whether government
undertakes surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence infoimation).
178. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1805(aX5) (1994)).
179. See id. at 77 n.6 (noting that "representations and certifications submitted in support
of an application for ISA surveillance should be presumed valid").
180. Id. at 77.
181. See id. (noting that neither FISC nor any court entertaining challenge to FISA sur-
veillance has "authority to second-guess the executive branch's certifications").
182. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (noting Supreme Court's refusal to
validate governmental surveillance postfacto).
183. See Marrera v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 622 F. Supp. 51, 53 (D.D.C. 1985) (noting
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concealed considering the clandestine nature of counterintelligence
operations. 18 However, FISA detractors "argue that the secrecythat surrounds
the FISC prevents a determination of whether... the FISC has become a
captive of the national security establishment and serves only to encourage
executive officials, now protected by judicial approval, to conduct activities
that would otherwise never have been proposed."'85 This argument derives
considerable weight from the fact that in the first ten years of FISA's existence,
the FISC denied none of the more than 4,000 applications and that by the year
2000, the court had approved over 11,000 applications.' 8
FISA's secrecy also presents a unique problem for a criminal defendant
seeking to suppress FISA surveillance evidence or challenge a conviction
based on such evidence. Section 1806(f) of the Act requires that the district
court judge entertaining a defendant's challenge to a FISA application "review
in camera and ex parte the application, order, and such other [necessary]
materials relating to the surveillance" whenever "the Attorney General files
an affidavit under oath that disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the
national security of the United States."8 " Thus, FISA often will not allow a
defendant the opportunity to contest adequately the validity of surveillance or
the admissibility of crucial evidence obtained thereby. Although courts have
affirmed the constitutionality of this reality, 8" the provision nevertheless
augments the possibility that governmental abuse of FISA will go undiscov-
ered.
3. FISA Under Fire: Challenges to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act
Not surprisingly, in light of the preceding discussion, FISA has endured
repeated challenges throughout its existence, many founded on issues consid-
Freedom of Information Exemption available for FISA materials that "[are] specifically
authorized to be kept secret in the interests of national security"); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)
(1994) (noting that FISA surveillance orders are to be ex parte); id. § 1806(f) (requiring judge
reviewing challenge to FISA surveillance to hold hearing in camera and ex parte upon request
of Attorney Oeneral).
184. See Reimers, supra note 25, at 59 (noting that once investigation is made public
"[a]ny further pursuit of a FISA warrant... would [defeat the investigation's] purpose. The
cat [would be] out of the bag.").
185. Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 815.
186. See Reimers, supra note 25, at 91 (noting that "in the last 20 years, over 11,000
wiretaps or search warrants were approved by the FISA court").
187. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (2001).
188. See United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141,148-49 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding that 50
U.S.C. § 1806(f) does not violate Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
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ered by Congress before enactment." 9 However, just as they endorsed the
existence of a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment,' °
lower federal courts consistently have upheld FISA against myriad constitu-
tional attacks. 191 The most important challenges to FISA's validity for pur-
poses of this Note are: (1) those asserting that judicially authorized surveil-
lance in the absence of probable cause that a crime is being, has been, or is
about to be committed is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment;
and (2) those disputing the efficacy of FISA's implementation by the execu-
tive and FISC.
19
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's decision in United States
v. Duggan u effectively illustrates the federal judiciary's treatment of these
arguments. 95 In Duggan, 9 most of the defendants - alleged agents of the
189. See Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 816 (noting constitutional issues "debated during
consideration of the various bills that preceded the enactment of HiSA have persisted").
190. See United States v. Duggan, 743 Fl2d 59, 72 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that "[plrior to
the enactment of FISA, virtually every court that had addressed the issue had concluded that the
President had the inherent power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance to collect
foreign intelligence information, and that such surveillances constituted an exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment").
191. See Reimers, supra note 25, at 77 (noting that "federal courts have upheld FISA's
constitutionality from just about every angle of attack").
192. See Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 816 (noting continued "concern over whether
surveillance should be authorized" without traditional probable cause determination).
193. See id. at 816-17 (noting that "faithfulness of FISA implementation by the Executive
and the FISC... has undergone repeated scrutiny by the federal courts").
194. 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
195. See Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 817 (noting that opinion inDuggan best illustrates
"arguments challenging the structure and implementation of FISA" and judicial response to
them).
196. See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59,77 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding FISA constitu-
tional and finding evidence obtained incident to FISA surveillance admissible). In Duggan, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the constitutionality and appropriate
application of FISA in the context of an investigation of alleged members of the Provisional
Irish Republican Army (PIRA). Id. at 64. The defendants in Duggan appealed their convictions
for various firearms-related offenses on the grounds that, inter alia, the court should not have
admitted the FISA evidence that the Government relied upon to obtain the convictions. Id. at
64-65. The defendants asserted that FISA violated the Fourth Amendment, that it was overly
broad, and that the Government improperly applied it. Id. at 65. After reviewing the structure
of FISA, the Second Circuit rejected each of the defendants' arguments. Id. at 69-74. In
particular, the court noted the existence of a foreign intelligence exception before the enactment
of FISA and the Supreme Court's implicit authorization of a different probable cause standard
for national security cases such as Keith. Id. at 72-73. Thus, the court rejected the defendants'
constitutional arguments. Id. As to the allegedly improper implementation of FISA, the court
acknowledged the incorporation of the primary purpose doctrine, but concluded that evidence
obtained pursuant to a proper FISA warrant was admissible in a criminal trial. Id. at 77. Thus,
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Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) - were illegal aliens; Duggan,
however, was a United States citizen."9 Pursuant to a FISA warrant, the
government intercepted communications between Duggan and his co-conspir-
ators and videotaped Duggan's negotiations with a FBI agent who posed as an
arms dealer.1" The evidence thus obtained proved critical to the Govern-
ment's case against Duggan and the other PIRA members.'"
Pretrial, the defendants sought a hearing to suppress the FISA evidence
on the grounds, inter alia, that the Government improperly used FISA to
obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution, and that, in any event, the surveil-
lance was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.2' In response, the
acting Attorney General moved to have the issue heard in camera because
"disclosure or an adversary hearing with respect to [the surveillance] informa-
tion would harm the national security of the United States."20' The trial court
granted the Government's request and subsequently dismissed all of the
defendants' FISA arguments. 2°2 The defendants, undeterred, persisted in their
challenge to the Government's evidence post-trial on the grounds that the
Government did not name Duggan as a target in the surveillance application
as required under FISA.2 °3 The court rejected this argument as well.204 The
court ultimately convicted Duggan and the rest of the defendants on various
firearms offenses. 2°'
On appeal, the defendants renewed their challenges to the constitutional-
ity of FISA and its application in their case, providing the Second Circuit with
a prime opportunity to expound upon the Act.2°" The defendants' first constitu-
tional challenge centered on their assertion that FISA's structure was overly
broad. They alleged that the definitions of "foreign intelligence information"
and "agent of a foreign power" give "the Act unlimited scope and [permit] the
electronic surveillance of persons who 'may' be engaging in activities that
the court upheld the defendants' convictions. Id. at 85.
197. See id at 64-65 (discussing background of case).
198. See id. at 66 (describing means by which Government obtained evidence).
199. See id. at 65 (listing types of evidence used at trial).
200. See id. at 67 (noting defendants' contention that FISA surveillance was unconstitu-
tional and "that FISA had been improperly used simply to obtain evidence of criminal activity
rather than to protect the national security").
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 68 (discussing defendants' post-trial FISA motion).
204. Id.
205. See id. at 64 (listing defendants' convictions).
206. See id. at 64-65 (describing issues on appeal).
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'may' violate United States law. '2° The court noted the theoretical appeal of
the defendants' arguments, but concluded that their challenge to the scope of
FISA had no application to the case before the court.2"s Importantly, however,
the court asserted in dicta that it did not find FISA's concepts overly vague,
implicitly endorsing the structure Congress provided for national security
cases 209
The court then turned to the defendants' Fourth Amendment challenge. °
The court initially noted that prior to FISA there was general acceptance of a
foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment, grounded in the
executive's inherent authority under the Constitution, but that the Supreme
Court never had directly addressed the issue. 211 However, the court did find
support for FISA's procedures in Keith. The majority opinion in Keith asserted
that the Fourth Amendment's application to the realm of foreign intelligence
may differ from its application in the context of criminal investigations.212
Ultimately, the court found that FISA did not violate the Fourth Amendment:
We regard the procedures fashioned in FISA as a constitutionally adequate
balancing ofthe individual's Fourth Amendment rights against the nation's
need to obtain foreign intelligence information. The governmental
concerns ... make reasonable the adoption of prerequisites to surveillance
that are less stringent than those precedent to the issuance of a warrant for
a criminal investigation.... We conclude that [FISA's] requirements pro-
vide an appropriatebalancebetweenthe individual's interest inprivacy and
the government's need to obtain foreign intelligence information, and that
FISA does not violate the probable cause requirement ofthe Fourth Amend-
ment.2
13
207. Id. at 71.
208. See id. ("Interesting though these arguments may be in the abstract, they have no
application to the case at hand.... The sections of the Act relied upon by the defendants to
show that the Act is impermissibly broad are simply irrelevant to this case.").
209. See id. (stating that "even if we thought [the specified section of FISA's] concepts of
national defense, national security, or conduct of foreign affairs to be vague, which we do not,"
court nevertheless would refuse to reverse defendants' convictions because they did not result
from that section of FISA).
210. Id. at 72.
211. See id. (discussing history of Fourth Amendment challenges to executive surveillance
power).
212. See id. (noting that Keith "declined to address [the] issue," but "made [it] clear that
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment may change when differing governmental interests
are at stake and... that the governmental interests presented in national security investigations
differ substantially from those presented in traditional criminal investigations" (citations omit-
ted)).
213. Id. at 73-74.
59 WASH. &LEE L. REV 921 (2002)
Finally, the court turned to the defendants' assertion that the FISA sur-
veillance in the instant case was improper because the Government had sought
it "as part of a criminal investigation. '214  The court confirmed that FISA
surveillance primarily must seek to obtain foreign intelligence, but neverthe-
less rejected the defendants' argument.2"' After reviewing the FISA applica-
tion in camera, the court concluded that the Government had met FISA's
requirements throughout the conduct of the surveillance.216
The court went on to "emphasize that otherwise valid FISA surveillance
is not tainted simply because the government can anticipate that the fruits of
such surveillance may later be used... as evidence in a criminal trial.1217 The
effect of this portion of the court's opinion - just as it had been in the context
of the foreign intelligence exception - was to leave the primary purpose
doctrine as incorporated into FISA with no clear boundaries. This fact makes
evaluation ofthe constitutionality of PATRIOT's changes to FISA with respect
to the purpose of surveillance operations particularly troubling.218
B. Building the Wall: Separating the Intelligence and Law
Enforcement Communities
1. History, Development, and Incorporation into Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act
The historic rift between executive agencies charged with law enforce-
ment and those assigned intelligence duties is due in part to the reality that the
two groups traditionally have performed very different duties. 219 However, it
also has deep statutory roots. Congress implicitly endorsed separation in its
"first lunge into the Executive's realm of foreign intelligence," in the 1947
National Security Act.220 The National Security Act created the CIA and
granted it broad powers.221 Concurrently, however, the Act specifically for-
214. Id. at 77.
215. See id. (reiterating FISA certification process and limited judicial scrutiny).
216. See id. at 78 (affirming district court's finding that surveillance had proper motiva-
tion).
217. Id.
218. Without a clear judicial pronouncement as to when foreign intelligence is not "the
purpose" of FiSA surveillance, it is exceedingly difficult to determine how much leeway a court
will afford the executive when it asserts that foreign intelligence was a "substantial purpose" of
FISA surveillance.
219. See Jonathan M. Fredman, IntelligenceAgencies, Law Enforcement, and the Prosecu-
tion Team, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 331, 337 (1998) (noting that "each set of organizations
is created and operated with certain clear responsibilities").
220. 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-41 (1994).
221. See Reimers, supra note 25, at 73 (noting that National Security Act created CIA).
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bade the agency from exercising "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers,
or internal-security functions."'  One court espoused that the National
Security Act embodied "Congress'[s] firm resolve to insure that the CIA's
'power that flows from money and stealth' could not be turned loose in
domestic investigations of Americans."Im It was a reflection of "Congress's
realistic fear of a secret police, and its desire to protect America's security
without 'making the mistake of creating an American Gestapo."'" 4
The demarcation of duties set forth in the National Security Act persisted
through the second half of the twentieth century. ms However, during much of
this time, Congress largely disregarded executive surveillance efforts' and
was oblivious to ongoing executive surveillance mischief.' When these
widespread abuses "in the area[s] of intelligence and national security-related
activities" finally found their way into the congressional consciousness, they
created an "antagonism toward the Executive" that reinforced the sentiment
that intelligence gathering operations should remain entirely separate from
law enforcement operations.'m Thus, when Congress sought to structure
executive national security surveillance in FISA, it was keenly aware that the
new Act held the potential for abuse, and it incorporated the doctrine of
separation into the statute.'
2. Modern Realities Blurring the Line
As the preceding section noted, a primary reason for the historic division
of law enforcement operations and intelligence gathering activities was the
222. 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d) (1994).
223. Marks v. Central Intelligence Agency, 590 F.2d 997, 1007-08 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(Wright, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
224. Id. at 1001 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
225. See Fredman, supra note 219, at 335 (noting clear division between work of intelli-
gence and law enforcement communities during Cold War).
226. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (discussing Title M's specific exemp-
tion of national security related matters).
227. See Reimers, supra note 25, at 73 (noting that Congress trusted system created by
National Security Act, while executive intelligence agencies engaged in many questionable
warrantless surveillance activities).
228. Cinquegrana, supra note 33, at 806.
229. See 18 U.S.C. § 1806(b)<d) (2001) (limiting availability of information acquired by
FISA for criminal prosecutions); id. § 1806(k) (delineating authority to cooperate with law
enforcement); see also Protecting Constitulional Freedoms, supra note 36 (statement of Jerry
Berman, Executive Director, Center for Democracy & Technology) (noting that Congress
"demanded that the powers bestowed by FISA be strongly contained, and that a clear
separation - a wall - be erected between the unique and broad standards for surveillance de-
scribed in FISA, and those used in the rest of the criminal justice system").
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different roles these organizations played within the federal government. This
justification worked well in 1947, when there was very little overlap in the
communities' respective roles. 20  However, modem crimes such as interna-
tional terrorism and narcotics trafficking impose a challenge that has been the
catalyst for an "erosion of the jurisdictional firewall traditionally dividing
domestic law enforcement agencies from the intelligence community in the
United States.' In these areas, it is no longer clear which agency should take
the reins, and the traditional and statutory division has become less tenable. " 2
Notwithstanding the jurisdictional blurring, intelligence and law enforce-
ment communities still operate in paradigmatically different ways to accommo-
date their respective responsibilities. 3 The primary goal for law enforcement
agencies is the conviction of criminals." This function requires that law
enforcement act within "precise constitutional and statutory requirements" to
ensure that evidence obtained in the course of a particular investigation is
admissible in a subsequent prosecution.3" Furthermore, the investigative
sources supporting criminal prosecutions generally must be demonstrable and
available for challenge by defense counsel.' Intelligence agencies, on the
other hand, operate pursuant to an entirely different legal structure based on
entirely different authority."3 Many of the sources upon which the CIA, the
National Security Agency, and other executive intelligence organizations rely
cannot, by their nature, be exposed in court without jeopardizing ongoing oper-
ations, active agents, and sensitive national security information."8
The confluence of substantial overlap between intelligence and law
enforcement targets and persistently divergent modus operandi gives rise to
significant procedural and evidentiary problems." 9 Specifically, law enforce-
230. See Fredman, supra note 219, at 335 (noting that there was little overlap between
intelligence activities and law enforcement in 1947).
231. Id. at 331.
232. See id. at 336 (noting that "there is no clear primacy for either the law enforcement
or intelligence communities in the realms of international terrorism [and] narcotics").
233. See id. at 336-37 (noting that "law enforcement and intelligence communities remain
designed and operated in fundamentally dissimilar manners" to meet "certain clear responsibili-
ties").
234. See id. (discussing basic operation of law enforcement agencies).
235. Id.
236. See id. (describing practices of law enforcement agencies).
237. See id. (providing basic operation of intelligence agencies as contrast).
238. See id. (noting that "intelligence agencies normally depend on sources that cannot be
revealed in court").
239. See id. (presenting interesting discussion of criminal procedure issues arising out of
increasing overlap of law enforcement and intelligence operations).
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ment's reliance on evidence obtained by intelligence agencies may "jeopardize
the specific legal authority of those intelligence agencies to collect
information... and also could raise a question of compliance by the CIA with
the law enforcement proviso of the National Security Act."'  Undoubtedly
these problems will only become more pervasive as terrorism becomes the
chief threat to United States security. It remains to be seen, however, whether
Congress's statutory blurring of the jurisdictional lines in PATRIOT will
provide a remedy, complicate matters further, or create heretofore unforeseen
problems.
IV The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001
Many of the choices that we will face after September 11 will test both our
ideals and our resolve to defend them. And as these choices emerge, let us
first pause long enough to ask, "What does it gain us?","
The preceding Parts of this Note discuss the arduous task that both the
federal judiciary and Congress face whenever they seek to balance national
security interests against civil liberties concerns and construct a workable,
constitutional system of regulation for executive surveillance. PATRIOT
represents the latest effort at striking this balance and seeks to enable law
enforcement to meet emerging terrorist threats without curtailing Americans'
constitutional rights. It would be extremely naive, then, to assume that this
twenty-first centuy legislation will be immune from the difficulties that arose
for the laws bom of the twentieth century.
PATRIOT effects sweeping changes in the way the federal government
conducts national security investigations.242 Only time will tell what success
these changes will have in preventing further terrorist acts. Similarly, one
cannot know now what impact PATRIOT will have on civil liberties. How-
ever, the depth of the changes to the existing structure of foreign intelligence
gathering all but ensures new Fourth Amendment dilemmas.243 This, combined
with the fact that Congress drafted and enacted PATRIOT in what may be the
most trying time our nation ever has endured, makes it critically important that
scholars and citizens carefully examine the provisions of the Act against the
lessons of history. In particular, two sections of PATRIOT merit close atten-
tion and evaluation under Fourth Amendment principles: the provisions
240. Id. at331.
241. Preserving Freedoms, supra note 35 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
242. See infra Part IVA (discussing PATRIOT and changes it brings to FISA).
243. See infra Part IVA (discussing PATRIOT and changes it brings to FISA).
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allowing increased access to the relaxed standards of FISA, and those facilitat-
ing the dissemination of FISA information between the law enforcement and
intelligence communities.244
A. Specific Provisions
Several of PATRIOT's provisions increase the government's authority
and ability to monitor wire and electronic communication.1 5  This new
authority, coupled with the incredible technology available to law enforce-
ment, makes the capacity of government surveillance staggering.246 As the
administration began to push for new surveillance powers in the aftermath of
9-11, civil libertarians and national security experts began to question whether
the increased authority was the right solution because the executive "already
possess[ed] immense statutory power to act on [its] own without Congress or
extensive judicial involvement."
2 47
Some experts have suggested, perhaps cynically, that certain persons
forced PATRIOT through Congress to "maintain public support or to insulate
anticipated criminal prosecutions from constitutional challenges."'24  The
latter contention is quite tenable in light of the fact that the Supreme Court has
not yet addressed the constitutionality of FISA surveillance. 249 In considering
the changes PATRIOT brings to FISA and assessing the constitutionality of
the new laws as written, it is imperative to remember the possible motives
244. See infra Part IVA (discussing PATRIOT and changes it brings to SA).
245. See PATRIOT, supra note 18, § 201, 115 Stat. at 278 (adding terrorism offenses to
predicate offenses for which Title I orders are available); id. § 206, 115 Stat at 282 (authoriz-
ing roving wiretap surveillance pursuant to FISA warrant); id. § 209, 115 Stat. at 286-87
(allowing seizure of voice mail pursuant to search warrant rather than wiretap order); id. § 214,
115 Stat. at 286-87 (extending pen register/trap and trace authority to FISA); id. § 219, 115
Stat. at 291 (allowing issuance of nationwide surveillance warrants in terrorism investigations);
id. § 503, 115 Stat. at 364 (expanding DNA sample collection predicates to include all crimes
of violence as well as attempts and conspiracies to commit such crimes); id. § 507, 115 Stat. at
367-68 (authorizing ex parte orders to obtain education records in investigations of international
or domestic terrorism).
246. See Young, supra note 25, at 1066 (noting government's access to "powerful tech-
nologies for surveillance and monitoring of citizens" and that "technological advances will
continue to augment these substantial capabilities"); id. at 1070-71 (noting that combination of
surveillance technology and computer processing capabilities allows government to "monitor
its citizens ... more efficiently and more effectively").
247. Wider Surveillance Powers Urged, But Some Already Available, ABA JOURNAL
EREPORT, Sept. 21, 2001, at http'/www.abanetorg/jouaVereport/civil.html (last visited Sept.
23,2001).
248. Id.
249. See id. (noting that "Supreme Court never has confronted the constitutionality of
FISA-).
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underlying the Act's creation. Furthermore, it is particularly important to
address the manner in which agencies ultimately will use the new laws.
1. Section 218: Lowering the Threshold for Obtaining
FISA Authorization
The single most important provision in PATRIOT for purposes of this
Note seems quite trivial on its face: Section 218 of PATRIOT amends
Section 303(a)(7)(B) of FISA by striking "the purpose" and inserting "a
significant purpose.""2 This means that although the Attorney General origi-
nally had to certify that '"de purpose ofthe surveillance [was] to obtain foreign
intelligence information" in order to obtain FISA authorization, he now need
only certify that foreign intelligence is a "significant purpose" of the surveil-
lance.251 The textual modification to FISA is negligible, but the impact of the
change is potentially massive.
A testament to the significance of this seemingly inconsequential change
is the amount of congressional testimony and deliberation § 218 drew during
the consideration of PATRIOT.252 Senator Feingold summarized the prevailing
concern expressed by PATRIOT's detractors as follows:
I am also very troubled by the broad expansion of Government power
under... FISA. When Congress passed FISA in 1978, it granted to the
executive branch the power to conduct surveillance in foreign intelligence
investigations without having to meet the rigorous probable cause standard
underthe [F]ourth [A]mendment that is required for criminal investigations.
There is a lowerthreshold forobtaining a wiretap orderfrom the FISA court
because the FBI is not investigating a crime, it is investigating foreign
intelligence activities. But the law [before PATRIOT] requirs that intelli-
gence gathering be the primary purpose ofthe investigation in order for this
much lower standard to apply. [PATRIOT] changes that requirementY
m
Simply put, this change to FISA eviscerates the end result of years of judicial
and congressional efforts to delineate how the government may conduct
national security surveillance under the Constitution.
The implications of § 218 are particularly clear when considered against
the judiciary's consistent reliance on the primary purpose doctrine in reconcil-
ing the foreign intelligence exception with the Fourth Amendment, and Con-
250. PATRIOT, supra note 18, § 218,115 Stat. at 291 (emphasis added).
251. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(aX7) (2001).
252. See Constitutionality of Various Provisions of the Proposed Anti-Terrorism Act of
2001: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Douglas
W. Kmiec, Dean of the Law School, Catholic University of America) (noting that "a good deal
of debate has focused" on change to FISA).
253. 147 CoNG. REC. S11,021 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
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gress's inclusion of the doctrine inthe original structure of FISA 54 PATRIOT
excises the primary purpose doctrine from the structure of FISA and substi-
tutes an entirely new paradigm, which this Note calls the substantial purpose
doctrine. The net effect of this new doctrine is that overzealous prosecutors
now can invoke the skeleton key of terrorism in what might otherwise be
garden-variety criminal investigations, and open the door to the less stringent
judicial review of the FISC.55 Arguably, the primary purpose doctrine is
essential to the constitutionality of both the pre-FISA foreign intelligence
exception and FISA itself. It remains to be seen whether either can survive a
Fourth Amendment challenge without it.
The ease with which numerous entities already have used the fear of ter-
rorism to achieve their own ends makes the increased access to FISA warrants
particularly troubling. 6 As Senator Feingold recognized during consider-
ation of PATRIOT, "[ijt seems obvious that with this lower standard, the FBI
will ... try to use FISA as much as it can."257 This, Senator Feingold contin-
ued, often could abridge Fourth Amendment rights in terrorist investiga-
tions. 2ss This is not particularly troubling in the foreign terrorism context
254. See supra notes 136-46 and accompanying text (discussing primary purpose doctrine).
255. See 147 CONG. REC. S11,021-22 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (noting that
"FBI will... try to use FISA as much as it can"); W~rrEHEAD & ADEN, supra note 30, at 26
(noting that provision expands access to FISA's "looser standards").
256. Not surprisingly, one of the first examples of opportunistic use of America's new fear
of terrorism is lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill. Advocacy groups have recast their existing
goals in terms of bolstering homeland defense, hoping to secure funds already earmarked for
the war on terror. David E. Rosenbaum, Since September 11, Lobbyists Use New Pitches for
OldPleas, N.Y. TIMS ONLINE, Dec. 3,2001, at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/03/politics/
03LOBB.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2002). Observers also have drawn analogies between
terrorism and the actions of the leaders of Enron, the energy giant that declared bankruptcy amid
allegations of a spectacular accounting scandal. See Review and Outlook: The Federal Enron,
WAIL ST. J., Feb. 14,2002, at A20 (noting that "members of Congress are having a gay old time
accusing Enron executives of 'economic terrorism"). More importantly for this Note, some
observers have already labeled the war on drugs an indirect war on terrorism. See infra notes
292-98 and accompanying text (discussing potential for expansion of PATRIOT's tools to fight
war on drugs).
257. 147 CONG. REc. S 11,021-22 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
258. See 147 CoNG. REC. S11,022 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (discussing
possibility of abuse of Fourth Amendment rights in terrorism investigations). Senator Feingold
stated:
It seems obvious that with this lower standard, the FBI will... try to use FISA as
much as it can. And, of course, with terrorism investigations, that won't be difficult
because the terrorists are apparently sponsored or at least supported by foreign
governments. So this means the [F]ourth [A]mendment rights will be significantly
curtailed in many investigations of terrorist acts.
147 CONG. REC. S1 1,022 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
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because even entirely warrantless surveillance may still enjoy judicial exemp-
tion from the Fourth Amendment via the foreign intelligence exception. How-
ever, if the executive should implement PATRIOT for surveillance outside of
that context - for example, in a domestic terrorism investigation - the revised
FISA procedures may be inadequate to ensure that a search is constitutionally
reasonable.
The new relaxed standards that PATRIOT brings to FISA raises yet
another question: Why did the executive feel that it needed the lower stan-
dard? In its twenty-four-year history, the FISC has not "denied a single one of
more than 10,000 applications." 9 One could argue that the tragedy of 9-11
led the executive rashly to seek an expansion of FISA's jurisdictional breadth.
Although this expansion may enhance the United States' ability to defend
against terrorism, it concurrently increases the likelihood that executive
agencies will abuse FISA. Thus, PATRIOT circumvents FISA's original
intent: curbing executive abuse of the foreign intelligence exception.
2. Section 203: Sharing of Information Between Law Enforcement and
Intelligence Agencies
The fact that PATRIOT allows broad dissemination of information
obtained by FISA surveillance compounds the danger of granting executive
agencies increased access to FISA. Section 203(b) of PATRIOT amends the
criminal code to allow:
any investigative or law enforcement officer, or attorney for the Govern-
ment, who by any means authorizedby this chapter has obtainedknowledge
of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence
derived therefrom, may disclose such contents to any other Federal law
enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or
national security official to the extent that such contents include foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence information... to assist the official who
is to receive that information in the performance of his official duties.21°
Section 203 goes on to provide two new definitions of foreign intelligence
information. The first definition is fairly concise but still leaves room for
interpretation, encompassing information relating to the United States' ability
to protect against: (1) attack by a foreign power or its agent, (2) sabotage or
terrorism by a foreign power or its agent, or (3) espionage by a foreign power
or its agent." The second classification is much broader, defining information
259. Philip Shenon, Paper Court Comes to Life Over Secret Tribunal's Ruling on Post-
9/11 Police Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,2002, at A2.
260. PATRIOT, supra note 18, § 203(bX1), 115 Stat. at 280.
261. Id. § 203(bX2), 115 Stat. at 280.
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as foreign intelligence information whenever it relates to "the national defense
or the security of the United States; or the conduct of the foreign affairs of the
United States."2 62 Section 203(d) mirrors the provisions in § 203(b) to apply
the same authority and definitions to information obtained by intelligence
services. 26
These provisions were among the first used in the war against terrorism.2"
In fact, according to Attorney General Ashcrof, "information sharing and
cooperation are critical to winning the war on terror and PATRIOT's capacity
to increase these activities will be utilized to the fillest extent.'"2 6 It appears
that Ashcroft intends to eliminate completely any and all hindrances to full
harmonization of law enforcement and counterintelligence operations, "both
within [DOJ] and between [DOJ] and other federal intelligence agencies. ' 2s6
Although § 203 requires the Attorney General to adopt procedures in accor-
dance with existing law and the Federal Rules, it provides no further guidance
as to specific safeguards that the Attorney General should implement.267 As
this Note discusses in Part I.B. 1, DOJ has interpreted this ambiguity to allow
complete dissolution of the old "wall" in any new procedures.
Finally, although the new law reiterates the National Security Act's
prohibition against the CIA exercising police functions,268 PATRIOT neverthe-
less gives the head of the CIA control in determining what information that
agency may seek with FISA and how it should disseminate such information.
2 69
Essentially, this places the authority of the Director of the CIA above that of
the Attorney General in determining the course of what often will be domestic
262. Id. § 203(bX2Xc), 115 Stat. at 280.
263. Id. § 203(d), 115 Stat. at 281.
264. See Hearing on DOJ Oversight, supra note I (statement of John Ashcroft, Attorney
General) ("Within hours of passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, we [DOJ] made use of its
provisions to begin enhanced information sharing between the law-enforcement and intelligence
communities.").
265. Attorney General Ashcroft and Deputy Attorney General Thompson Announce
Reorganization andMobilization of the Nation'sJustice andLawEnforcementResources (Nov.
8, 2001), available at http'/Awww.jusfice.gov/ag/speeches/200l/agcrisisremarksl 1_08.htm (last
visited Oct. 13,2002).
266. Id. The Attorney General continued: "The Department of Justice is fully committed
to breaking down the bureaucratic and cultural barriers that prevent meaningful coordination
and cooperation between criminal law enforcement and the counterintelligence operations, both
within the department and between the department and other federal intelligence agencies." Id.
267. PATRIOT, supra note 18, § 203, 115 Stat. at 280.
268. See id, § 403(d), 115 Stat. at 343-43 (requiring implementation of procedures that
limit use of criminal history information supplied to Department of State and INS).
269. See id § 901, 115 Stat. at 387 (amending National Security Act provision defining
CIA Director's role to include "establish[ing] requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence
information to be collected under [FISA]").
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intelligence gathering operations, the fruits of which the government may use
for intelligence and law enforcement purposes.27 Given this provision, it is
safe to say that the doctrine of separation is officially dead, and that a modem
Big Brother is one step closer to reality.2 '
B. PATRIOT's Potential Threat to American Civil Liberties
"[There have been periods in our nation's history when civil liberties
have taken a back seat to what appeared at the time to be the legitimate
exigencies of war."2"' Indeed, our nation's comnitment to civil liberties has
waned consistently in times of war: during the Civil War, the federal govern-
ment suspended habeas corpus; during World War R it locked tens of thou-
sands of Japanese-Americans in internment camps; in the throes of the Cold
War, it blacklisted suspected communist sympathizers; and during the Viet-
nam War, it subjected dissidents to surveillance and harassment."n Today,
our nation is very much at war, and as the preceding discussion should make
clear, once again, we are departing dangerously from settled constitutional
principles. PATRIOT represents such a significant break with the ideology
that has guided our government in the conduct of national security surveil-
lance that the unfortunate "pieces of our past [may] become prologue.
27 4
During the Senate's consideration of PATRIOT, a number of Senators
expressed concern that 9-11 had robbed both the public and Congress of
commitment to traditional civil liberties.275 This concern seems valid when
considered in light of data from polls taken after 9-Il, which showed that
seventy-eight percent of respondents would accept increased security even at
the expense of privacy protections.7 6 Some legislators suggested that DOJ
seized on public opinion to take advantage of the crisis and obtain a broad
270. See WHrrEHEAD & ADEN, supra note 30, at 1I (noting that provision places "the CIA
over the Justice Department and the FBI").
271. See id. (noting that this provision "turns on its head existing policy and practice that
was put in place as a result of CIA abuses during the Cold War era and permits the CIA to begin
once again to spy on American citizens").
272. 147 CONG. REc. SI 1,020 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
273. See 147 CONG. REc. S1I,020 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (recounting
examples of historical times during which United States government subrogated civil liberties).
274. 147 CoNG. REc. S1 1,020 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
275. 147 CONG. REC. SI 1,020 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
276. See Kathryn Bafint & Alex Roth, Civil Liberties: Security Measures Pit Safety
Against Privacy, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 18, 2001, at Al (noting results of NBC Newe/
Wall Street journal poll). The same percentage of those polled said they "would support sur-
veillance of Internet communications; and 43 percent said they were willing to let the govern-
ment listen in on phone calls without a court order." Id.
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range of tools it had coveted for a long timeY7 Now that time mercifully has
softened the shock and terror of 9-11, it is time to reevaluate our nation's
willingness to trade privacy for security and consider PATRIOT with a more
level head.
1. Implementation and Expansion of PATRIOT Beyond Terrorism:
Fourth Amendment Concerns
One of the most foreseeable dangers of the new Act is that increased
access to the lower standards of FISA, combined with the statutory authority
to share information, will tempt overzealous executive officials to invoke
PATRIOT in areas beyond terrorism. DOJ already has opined that PATRIOT
allows FISA's implementation in investigations that are primarily law en-
forcement operations as long as the investigation also serves a significant
foreign intelligence end.27 In May of 2002, DOJ moved the FISC to "vacate
the minimization and 'wall' procedures in all cases now or ever before [that]
[c]ourt." '279 Under DOJ's proposed new minimization procedures, "criminal
prosecutors would... no longer be prohibited from 'directing or controlling'
counterintelligence investigations involving use of the FISA toward law
enforcement objectives.2 .0 Moreover, "criminal prosecutors would... be
empowered to direct the use of FISA surveillances and searches toward law
enforcement objectives by advising FBI intelligence officials on the initiation,
operation, continuation and expansion of FISA authority from [the FISC]."2'2
In its first public opinion in its twenty-four-year existence, the FISC
refused to accept DOJ's proposal. The court's reasoning is quite lucid:
The 2002 [proposed] procedures appear to be designed to amend the law
and substitute the FISA for Title Il electronic surveillances and Rule 41
searches. This may be because the government is unable to meet the
substantive requirements of these law enforcement tools, or because their
administrative burdens are too onerous. In either case, the FISA's defini-
tion of minimization procedures has not changed, and these procedures
277. See 147 CoNG. REC. S11,021 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (characterizing
original bill proposal from administration as containing provisions objectionable to notions of
civil liberty). Senator Feingold called one such proposal "simply an effort on the part of [DOJ]
to take advantage of the emergency situation and get something that they've wanted for a long
time." 147 CONG. REc. SI 1,020 (2001) (statement of Sen. Fcingold).
278. Susan Schmidt, Recognition ofPatriotAct Urged, WASH. POST, Aug. 24,2002, at A6.
279. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, No. 02-
429, slip op. at 1 (U.S. F.I.S.C. May 17, 2002), available at http:/www.dd.uscourts.gov/
FISA-02-429.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2002).
280. Id. at 25.
281. Id.
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cannot be used by the government to amend the Act in ways Congress has
not. 2
Withstanding the steamroller momentum of the Bush administration's efforts
to expand its prerogative in how to fight the war on terror, the FISC inter-
preted PATRIOT as maintaining some vestige ofthe "wall.""2 3 Ultimately, the
FISC refused to allow criminal prosecutors to appropriate the "legal advan-
tages conceived by Congress to be used by U.S. intelligence agencies" and
thereby substitute FISA for Title 1H. 2 4
However, the FISC's unanimous decision did not deter Attorney General
Ashcroft and DOJ, who subsequefitly applied for FISA authorization using the
denounced minimization procedures. 5 When this application was denied, the
Government then appealed to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review (FISCR). 28 6 In the first time the FISCR had convened since its cre-
ation in 1978,27 the court overturned the FISC's decision, finding that PA-
TRIOT had "largely erased whatever boundaries existed between
counterintelligence and domestic law enforcement.""2 ' The FISCR decided
that the restrictions imposed by the [FISC] are not required by FISA or the
Constitution. " ' Despite its thorough fifty-six page decision, which addressed
much of the case history considered in this Note, the FISCR's ultimate consti-
tutional conclusion does not inspire confidence:
We acknowledge... that the constitutional question presented by this
case - whether Congress's disapproval of the primary purpose test is
consistent with the Fourth Amendment has no definitive jurisprudential
answer .... Even without taking into account the President's inherent
constitutional authorityto conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveil-
lance, we think the procedures and government showings required under
FISA if they do not meet the minimum Fourth Amendment warrant re-
quirements standards, certainly come close. We, therefore, believe
firmly,... that FISA as amended is constitutionalbecause the surveillance
it authorizes are reasonable.'
282. Id. at 22.
283. See id. at 23-25 (discussing dangers of Attorney General's proposed procedures).
284. Id. at 24.
285. See In re Sealed Case, No. 02-001, 2002 WL 31546991 at *5 (U.S. F.I.S.C.R. Nov.
18, 2002) (hereinafter FISCR Decision) (explaining how May 17th opinion was not order
actually appealed, but was "basic decision before" FISCR).
286. Id.
287. Id. at *1.
288. JessBravin,RulingEases Terror-SuspectPursuit, WALL ST. J.,Nov. 19,2002, atA2.
289. FISCR Decision at *1.
290. Id. at *55.
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With this undeniably tentative constitutional pronouncement, the FISCR has
cleared the way for nearly unfettered implementation of FISA surveillance in
a variety of contexts beyond terrorism per se."
The area most likely to see utilization of the tools provided to fight the
war on terror is narcotics enforcement.2" From the beginning, "officials have
tried to link the new war on terror to the old war on drugs." 3 It seems clear
that the Bush administration intends to merge antiterrorism efforts with drug
interdiction. In his February 2, 2002 remarks on the 2002 National Drug
Policy, President Bush drew an unambiguous connection:
Youknow, I'm asked all thetime, how can I help fight againstterror? What
can I do, what can I as a citizen do to defend America? Well, one thingyou
can do is not purchase illegal drugs. Make no mistake about it, if you're
buying illegal drugs in America, it is likelythat the money is going to end up
in the hands of terrorist organizations. Just think about the Taliban in
Afghanistan- 70 percent of the world's opium trade came from Afghani-
stan, resultinqgin significant income to the Taliban, significant amount[s] of
money to the people that were harboring and feeding and hiding those who
attacked and killed thousands of innocent Americans on September the
11 th. When we fight drugs, we fight the war on terror.2
The Bush administration even pitched its drugs-to-terror connection during the
television coverage of the 2002 Super Bowl, when the Office of National
291. See id. at *36 ("That is not to deny that ordinary crimes might be inextricably
intertwined with foreign intelligence crimes. For example, if a group of international terrorists
were to engage in bank robberies in order to finance the manufacture of a bomb, evidence of
the bank robbery should be treated just as evidence of the terrorist act itself."). The FISCR's
decision came down only days before the final publication deadline for this Note. Thus, the
instant consideration of the decision and its ramifications is, unavoidably, constrained.
However, the import and divisiveness of this decision is clear from the reactions within the
government. For instance, Attorney General Ashcrofl "called the ruling 'a victory for liberty,
safety and the security of the American people," while the senior Democrat on the House
Judiciary Committee, John Conyers, labeled the ruling "despicable" and suggested that it was
another example of how the Bush administration "is dismantling the basic rights afforded to
every American under the Constitution." Bravin, supra note 288. An interested reader should
consider the FISCR's opinion in full for a more complete perspective.
292. See Remarks of President Bush on 2002 National Drug Control Policy, East Room,
Feb. 12,2002, at httpi/www.whitehous.gov/newalreleases/2002/02/20020212-8.html [herein-
after National Drug Control Policy Remarks] ("[T]he drug trade supports terrorist networks.
When people purchase drugs, they put money in the hands of those who want to hurt America,
hurt our allies. Drugs attack everything that is the best about this country, and I intend to do
something about them.").
293. Tim Golden, The World: A War on Terror Meets a War on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES LATE
EDMON, Nov. 25,2001, at § 4, p.4, col.l.
294. National Drug Control Policy Remarks, supra note 292 (emphasis added).
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Drug Control Policy spent nearly $3.5 million to produce and air two commer-
cials during the game.295 One of the spots put the issue thus: 'Where do
terrorists get their money?... If you buy drugs, some of it might come from
YOU-.o29  And where does the war on drugs get its money? The Wall Street
Journal reported recently that "[tihe Drug Enforcement Administration will
receive $35 million from the Justice Department for counterterrorism and
intelligence support.
' 29
Regardless of whether there is justification for the correlation between
drug use and terrorism, it seems clear that the executive intends to treat the
two problems as like evils. Drug-enforcement operations account for nearly
eighty percent of criminal surveillance applications,' and as the administra-
tion begins to cast efforts to combat narcotics as efforts to fight the war on
terror, it is entirely possible - even likely - that it will invoke PATRIOT's
new surveillance authority in drug-enforcement operations. In such a context,
the rubberstamp approval history of the FISC court, combined with the
inaccessibility of FISA applications to those who are targets, could effect a
circumvention of the Fourth Amendment for heretofore common criminal
investigations.
2. Inadequate Safeguards
Although PATRIOT dramatically increases the ability of the government
to make use of questionable surveillance procedures, it provides little in the
way of new safeguards. As discussed in Part III.A.2, herein, many consider
the FISC too entrenched within the culture of those seeking to protect our
nation to provide an adequate constitutional check against overzealous or
295. Anti-Drug Ads Play the Terror Card; Linking Street Buys to Funding Militant Net-
works Draws Fire, SAN. FRAN. CHRON., Feb. 4,2002, at Al.
296. Id. The San Francisco Chronicle article notes that the ads were met with criticism.
The paper quoted Matthew Briggs, an assistant director of New York's Drug Policy Alliance,
as saying, "It's a cynical, cheap shot to take in the current political environment, to make it
sound like a kid who smokes pot is responsible for putting cash in the hands of Osama bin
Laden is ludicrous." Id. The administration's conclusion that drug trafficking finances
terrorism, fits nicely with FISCR's explicit endorsement of FISA surveillance for such circum-
stances. See supra note 291 (recounting FISCR's "bank robbery" example).
297. DEA Will Get $35 Million forAfghanistan Programs, WAU ST. J., Feb. 5,2002.
298. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Wiretap Report 2000: Table 7 Autho-
rized Intercepts Granted Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2519 as Reported in Wiretap Reports for Calen-
dar Years 1990-2000 (recording that of 12,039 authorized wiretaps, 8,495 cited narcotics as
primary offense), available at http'/www.uscouis.gov/wiretap00/contents.html (last visited
March 4,2001); see also Young, supra note 25, at 1026 (Wiretaps were sought predominantly
for narcotics-related offenses." (citation omitted)).
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 921 (2002)
improper executive action.299 Moreover, even if the FISC meets its oversight
burden, it still must rely on the executive's representations, which are not
necessarily reliable. In fact, in September of 2000 the government admitted to
committing some seventy-five "misstatements or omissions of material facts"
in FISA surveillance applications."°° Because of the privileged nature of the
information often contained in FISA applications and orders, there is little
chance that anyone in the future will know of executive abuse of PATRIOT,
and any exposure certainly will not occur before the damage is done.
The threat to civil liberties is exacerbated by a policy that has become
increasingly clear: The Bush administration, and especially Attorney General
Ashcroft, want to limit the public's and Congress's access to anything pertain-
ing to terrorism investigations. First, an exclusionary provision is built into
PATRIOT that allows the delay of reports to Congress on intelligence
matters.3 1 Second, Ashcroft has voiced resistance to congressional meddling
in hearings reviewing the administration's anti-terrorism policy and asserted
the President's constitutional authority to act on his own. 30 2 This resistance
has gathered steam and secrecy has become a clear objective of the adminis-
tration.3  This emphasis on secrecy further limits oversight efforts and makes
discovery of Fourth Amendment abuses much less likely, thereby increasing
the particular danger that Justice Powell identified in Katz: that "unreviewed
299. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text (discussing assertions that FISC is
puppet of executive).
300. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, No. 02-
429, slip op. at 16 (U.S. F.I.S.C. May 17, 2002), available at http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/FI
SA-02-429.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2002); Schmidt, supra note 278, at A6, Shenon, supra
note 259, at Al2.
301. See PATRIOT, supra note 18, § 904, 115 Stat. at 387-88 (granting authority to delay
temporarily reports to Congress on intelligence matters).
302. See Hearing on DOJ Oversight, supra note I (statement of John Ashcroft, Attorney
General) ("[Clongress's power of oversight is not without limits.... In some areas, however,
I cannot and will not consult you.... For centuries, Congress has recognized [the power of the
President as Commander-in-Chief] and the Supreme Court has never held that any Congress
may limit it.").
303. See Don Wycliff, Top Secret Just Whose Government Is It Anyway?, CI. TRW.,
Jan. 17, 2002, at 23 (noting Bush administration's "fondness for secrecy" and Ashcrofl's "Oct.
12 memorandum to executive agencies" urging restriction of grants of information under
Freedom of Information Act). This article notes that the implication ofAshcroft' s memo is "that
freedom of information is opposed to or in competition with other important values such as
'national security,' 'functional and efficient' government, 'enhancing the effectiveness of our
law enforcement agencies,' protecting 'sensitive business information' and 'preserving personal
privacy."' Id.; see also Eric J. Sinrod, Defanging the Freedom of Information Act, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 22, 2002, at 5 (noting that Ashcroft's new policy must "not frustrate the core purpose of
the FOIA shining a light on 'what the government is up to'").
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executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating
evidence."
3°4
It is important to note that secrecy also limits the effectiveness of the
internal checks contained within PATRIOT. Section 223 of PATRIOT pro-
vides for civil liability in the event of unauthorized disclosure,3° but in the
context of national security surveillance there is little or no recourse for citi-
zens injured by executive impropriety. 311 Often, it is impossible to sustain a
claim "for damages based on statutory and constitutional violations" inflicted
by the participants in national security surveillance. 3' Finally, the limitations
to new surveillance authority imposed by sunset provisions 3" do nothing to
compensate those whose liberties the government treads upon before PA-
TRIOT's sun goes down.
V Conclusion
All of the United States government's efforts to combat terrorism across
the globe have done little to allay the lingering fear that 9-11 branded on the
heart of our nation. The fact is that each nightly newscast brings more con-
cerns. Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the war on terror is that we are
fighting a faceless enemy. Terrorism comes in many forms, carried out by
men and women of all nationalities and creeds. However, all terrorists share
one thing in common - brutality. The United States is fighting a war against
an enemy that will force a captured journalist to sit in front of a camera and
recite that he is a Jew and that his father was a Jew, as the enemy's agent slips
up from behind and slits the journalist's throat.3 ' The war on terror is a war
against a hatred that is hard to comprehend, a hatred strong enough to lead
people to offer willingly their lives in order to kill others.
304. Keith, 407 U.S. at 314.
305. PATRIOT, supra note 18, § 223, 115 Stat at 293-94.
306. See Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1982) [Halkin 11] ("As a result of
that ruling (Halkin I], plaintiffs' claims against the NSA and several individual officials
connected with that agency's monitoring activities could not be proved, and the complaint as
to those defendants was dismissed."); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1978) [Halkin
] (upholding Secretary of Defense's claim of state secret privilege and ruling that NSA did not
have to disclose interception of plaintiffs' communications).
307. Halkin I, 690 F.2d at 990 (emphasis omitted).
308. See PATRIOT, supra note 18, § 224, 115 Stat. at 294 (ceasing effect of parts of Title
as of December 31,2005).
309. John Ward Anderson & Peter Baker, Killers Likely Never Intended to Free Pearl
Abduction and Videotaped Slaying of Reporter Meant to Send Message, Pakistani Police Say,
WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2002, at Al 6.
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It is hardly surprising, then, that we find ourselves reevaluating what it
means to be free and how far we are able to go to protect our civil liberties
without endangering our lives. The world is a very different place now than
it was before September 11, 2001, and we must recognize that this new world
may require an entirely different approach. PATRIOT's provisions largely
remove modem national security surveillance efforts from the principles set
forth in Katz, Keith, and their progeny. However, that does not mean that
PATRIOT's provisions are necessarily evil; evil has made them a necessity.
Further, the jurisprudence of the foreign intelligence exception and of FISA,
as well as the magnitude of the dangers facing our country, make it likely that
PATRIOT will survive challenges in the courts.
However, one cannot deny the expansive new authority PATRIOT vests
in the executive and the potential for abuse that this authority necessarily
brings; PATRIOT cracks the door for Big Brother. As with any new author-
ity, there is a new level of responsibility, not just for the executive, but also
for Congress and the public in overseeing the implementation of PATRIOT.
We must never forget Justice Brandeis's warning that "[t]he greatest dangers
to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but
without understanding.
310
PATRIOT is an understandable and perhaps justifiable response to the
grave threat painfully realized on 9-11. However, we should be careful not to
allow our anti-terrorist fervor to spill over into the general fight against crime.
To do so is to ignore the centuries of legislation and jurisprudence that have
made our criminal justice system the envy of the civilized world. Recognizing
the inevitability of a new approach to fighting terrorism should not force us
to lose the resolve to protect our civil liberties. We must bear in mind that
"the history of the last five decades shows that attacks on privacy are not an
anomaly. When government has the power to invade privacy, abuses
occur. 311 The challenge facing our country is daunting, but we should seek
to meet it head on. It is time for us to rethink our prerogatives and consider
how best to bring our democratic society into the new millennium without
sacrificing two and a half centuries of freedom.
310. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
311. Youngsupranote25,at 1077(quotingWHrrFIIDDFFIE&SUSANLANDAN, PRIVACY
ON Tim LINE: THE PoLrIcs OF WIRETAPPINo AND ENCRYPTION 148 (1998)).
